Taking Finance Seriously:  How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers by Bartlett III, Robert P.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 76 Issue 4 Article 2 
2008 
Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding 
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers 
Robert P. Bartlett III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in 
Corporate Takeovers, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1975 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in 
Corporate Takeovers 
Cover Page Footnote 
Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Helpful discussions, comments, and 
suggestions were provided by Royce Barondes, Dan Bodansky, Brian Broughman, Bill Carney, Deborah 
DeMott, Vic Fleischer, George Geis, Mike Guttentag, Paul Heald, Wally Hellerstein, Darian Ibrahim, Thom 
Lambert, Jeff Netter, Chuck O'Kelley, Victoria Plaut, Annette Poulsen, Usha Rodrigues, Maggie Sachs, 
Jason Solomon, and Mike Wells. This Article also benefited from comments received from participants at 
the 2007 Law & Entrepreneurship Workshop at the University of Wisconsin School of Law and a faculty 
workshop at the University of Missouri School of Law. Lastly, special thanks go to Marc Auerbach of 
Standard & Poor's and Eric Tutterow of Fitch Ratings for providing helpful data and discussion. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol76/iss4/2 
ARTICLES
TAKING FINANCE SERIOUSLY: HOW DEBT
FINANCING DISTORTS BIDDING OUTCOMES IN
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
Robert P. Bartlett IH*
Economic analysis of corporate takeovers has traditionally advocated
legal doctrines that ensure a target company in a takeover contest is
acquired by the bidder willing to pay the most for it. The reason stems from
the conventional assumption that a bidder's offer price should reflect its
ability to put a target's assets to productive use.
This Article challenges this assumption by turning to the success of
private equity firms in outbidding publicly traded, strategic bidders during
the takeover wave of 2004 to 2007. Using standard valuation modeling,
this Article reveals how a critical component of any bidder 's valuation of a
target stems from its source of acquisition financing. Specifically, a
bidder's ability to finance a takeover with debt can lead to a significant
increase in its valuation of a target owing to a defacto government subsidy
created by the deductibility of interest payments. Simultaneously, however,
not every bidder has the ability to utilize debt financing to the same extent-
a point emphasized in forty years of finance research. The result is that
during periods of robust credit markets, such as occurred during 2004 to
2007, the highest bidders in takeover contests may often be those bidders,
such as private equity firms, who are capable of using large amounts of
debt financing.
By highlighting the critical role of finance in explaining bidder
valuations, this Article illustrates how accurate economic analysis of
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Article also benefited from comments received from participants at the 2007 Law &
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takeovers requires careful attention to bidders' divergent financing
decisions. Indeed, by failing to take finance seriously, traditional takeover
scholarship may very well be advocating legal rules that promote inefficient
takeovers.
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INTRODUCTION
When the history of the most recent takeover boom is written, November
17, 2006, will no doubt occupy a central position. On that day, HCA, Inc.,
the country's largest hospital operator, closed its $33 billion leveraged
buyout (LBO). It was the first time an LBO exceeded $30 billion,
displacing the 1989 buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc., as the largest LBO in
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history.1  Yet, to truly understand this remarkable transaction, it is
necessary to look back six months to May 23, 2006. It was on that day that
HCA's board of directors convened to discuss its strategic options with its
investment bank, Merrill Lynch & Co., in light of the stagnant growth in
HCA's core business. 2
Merrill's conclusions at that meeting were stark; only two practical
options existed to increase shareholder value. First was a leveraged
recapitalization in which the company would repurchase up to $6 billion of
its publicly traded stock. To fund the repurchase, the company would
significantly increase its debt load up to three times the company's earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). 3 Because
interest payments on debt are tax deductible, the new capital structure
would permit HCA to save billions in tax payments, thus delivering
shareholder value to its remaining public shareholders. The downside was
that HCA would become highly leveraged, and, Merrill cautioned, "HCA's
valuation/trading multiple would likely be pressured due to the public
market's aversion to the increased operating risk inherent in a highly
levered situation." 4
The alternative option was an LBO. In such a transaction, one or more
private equity firms would acquire the company using a combination of
equity contributions and debt financing. Even without identifying any
particular bidder or change to HCA's operations, Merrill suggested the
transaction could deliver shareholder value in the form of an acquisition
premium, which would reflect the significant tax savings arising from the
debt financing. Moreover, these tax savings would far exceed what the
company could realize in a leveraged recapitalization. For in an LBO,
Merrill reported-and this time without reservation-the company could
"be leveraged up to 6.0 Debt to EBITDA.' '5 Faced with these choices, the
board opted to pursue an LBO.
The Merrill report, buried in HCA's Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings, thus suggests a key justification for why so
many public companies elected to "go private" rather than remain public
during the buyout wave of 2004 to 2007: HCA could take on more debt as
a private company than as a public company and, consequently, deliver
greater shareholder value by taking larger interest deductions. But why
would a prominent investment bank draw this conclusion about HCA's
maximum debt capacity? Was the bank simply trying to steer the board
towards going private? Or worse, was it justifying a transaction that had
previously been decided upon by its client? Could there be any merit to the
1. See Joshua Hamerman, Syndicated Loan Issuance for M&A Roars, Mergers &
Acquisitions Report, Jan. 15, 2007, at 1.
2. See Merrill Lynch, Presentation to the Board of Directors of HCA, Inc. (May 25, 2006),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/$/SEC/Filing.asp?404;http://secinfo.com/dsVsfv7Fu.9.htm.
3. See id. at 23.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 35.
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notion that, in the competition for the future of HCA, "public HCA" was
somehow at a competitive disadvantage to "private HCA" in terms of how
much debt financing it could use and therefore how much shareholder value
it could offer?
The primary argument presented in this Article is that corporate
scholarship has all too often ignored a basic insight of corporate finance:
that the relative use of debt financing among bidders plays a central-often
the central-role in determining the outcome of takeover contests. In a
world with corporate taxes, the decision to finance an acquisition with debt
creates a de facto government subsidy for a bidder owing to the
deductibility of interest payments on debt. At the same time, however, a
large body of literature in finance has demonstrated that not every bidder is
willing and able to utilize debt financing to the same extent. Indeed, as
HCA demonstrated, even where the "rival bidder" was simply the privately
held version of a publicly traded company, private HCA somehow had
more flexibility in using debt financing than public HCA.
By accounting for the uneven use of debt financing in the takeover
market, this Article reveals how a substantial amount of takeover
scholarship has incorrectly analyzed the operation of real world takeovers.
The source of the misapprehension arises from the normative paradigm
used by most takeover scholars. Motivated by a desire to ensure that
resources are allocated to their highest valued use, countless scholars have
examined takeovers with the aim of enhancing allocational efficiency,
ranging from analysis of the desirability of hostile takeovers, 6 the legality of
takeover defenses, 7 the wisdom of allowing boards to facilitate competing
6. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1145, 1148 n.5 (1984) ("Most of those who have participated in the debate over the
desirability of encouraging competing bids have shared the view that takeovers promote
efficiency ...."); Paul N. Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs
Rule-A Comment on CTS Corporation, 13 J. Corp. L. 317, 321 (1988) ("[T]he tender offer
is favored on the ground that it facilitates the movement of assets to their highest uses,
thereby ensuring efficient allocation of resources."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1182 (1981) ("Our argument relies on the premise that [hostile] tender
offers increase social welfare by moving productive assets to higher valued uses and to the
hands of better managers."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1497 (1989) ("[A]t least some completed takeovers undoubtedly result
in a substitution of more efficient managers for less efficient managers, or of more efficient
allocations of resources for less efficient allocations."); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 62
(1982) ("There is agreement that tender offers serve an allocational role, and that
competitive pricing generally facilitates the shifting of assets to their most productive
users."); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) ("The effects of allowing
the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer are substantial .... The
reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve
efficiency and competition, is hindered.").
7. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1175 (arguing against all defensive
tactics on the ground that they impede hostile takeovers, thereby depriving shareholders of
an acquisition premium that "reflects a ... social gain from the superior employment of the
1978 [Vol. 76
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takeover offers,8 and the appropriateness of "deal protection" devices. 9 Yet
lacking an objective means to measure the social welfare effects of a
proposed acquisition, those writing within the allocational efficiency
normative paradigm have had to assume that the bidder willing to pay the
most for a target firm is the bidder best able to utilize the target's assets. 10
As this Article demonstrates, recognizing the power of debt financing to
affect bidder valuations forces us to grapple with an uncomfortable feature
of the allocational efficiency normative paradigm that is all too often
ignored: offer price alone is not necessarily a reliable proxy for identifying
the socially optimal bidder. The fact that a particular bidder is willing to
pay the most for a target could reflect the bidder's anticipated operating
efficiencies with the target, but it could also reflect a simple willingness to
use a greater degree of debt financing in structuring its bid. In this latter
situation, a government subsidy-not a bidder's superior ability to utilize
target's assets-would account for the highest bid. The long tradition of
takeover scholarship advocating legal rules that ensure a target is acquired
firm's assets"); Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale
L.J. 1739, 1743 (1994) ("According to [a] widely held view, target managements will, if
permitted, use ... defensive tactics to protect their jobs [in the face of a hostile takeover],
and thus will obstruct the transfer of corporate assets to their highest valued use (that is,
obstruct the goal of allocative efficiency). Consistent with that viewpoint, most corporate
law scholars call for the abolition of virtually all takeover defenses ...." ); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling
Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775, 792 n.65 (1982) ("[T]he increase in managerial discretion
[due to the use of defensive tactics] ... represents a threat to societal interests in the efficient
allocation of resources." (citations omitted)); Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of
Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. Corp. L. 569, 582
(2004) ("[A] decision motivated by entrenchment to block a takeover... harms shareholders
by impeding the efficient allocation of resources and muting the disciplinary effects of the
market for corporate control.").
8. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1174-82 (arguing against
facilitating competing takeover bids because it needlessly reduces the efficacy of the tender
offer process in "moving productive assets to higher valued uses and to the hands of better
managers"); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 872 (1981) ("[E]ven if competitive
bidding reduces the overall number of offerors, the increase in efficiency from allocating
target assets to their most efficient user must be balanced against the reduction in efficiency
from fewer offers."); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1030 (1982) (arguing that facilitating competing
tender offers "has several socially beneficial effects, such as the allocation of targets' assets
to their most valuable use.").
9. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 7, at 1743 ("It seems fair to say.., that most
corporate law scholars and courts agree that some lockups should be invalidated as contrary
to the interests of target shareholders and/or the goal of allocational efficiency.").
10. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1176 n.40 ("Bidding usually serves
the function of allocating goods to their highest valued uses; the best indication of the ability
to put something to a valuable use is the willingness to pay for it."); Gilson, supra note 8, at
872 ("As a general principle, allocating resources among competing claimants by price is
desirable because it places resources with the most efficient users."); Edward B. Rock,
Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1367, 1376 n.27 (1989)
(assuming that "on the whole, allocational efficiency is increased if a target is acquired by
the bidder willing to pay the most for it").
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by the highest valuing bidder might therefore promote inefficient takeovers
in certain contexts. Figure 1 illustrates this insight:
Figure 1: Effect of Debt-Financing on Bidder Valuations of a Target
Bi der.. ... ..
Strategic Buyer; (rvtqiyin;
Zero Debt-Financing i Deb iacn
I De Facto Subsidy
Arising-from-
Debt-Financing
Valuation Present Value of
of Target: Cash Flows Bidder I PrescntValueof-
Expects from Target Cash Flows Bidder 2
Expects from Target
Bidder I Bidder 2
Nor is the risk of inefficient takeovers of simply academic significance.
As a matter of Delaware law, boards of directors are charged in change-in-
control takeovers with the very objective desired by adherents of the
allocational efficiency normative paradigm: "to secure the transaction
offering the best value reasonably available for [target's] stockholders."'11
Assuming boards follow this mandate, directors may periodically favor
suboptimal bidders in light of bidders' divergent financing decisions. This
seems particularly true when robust credit markets permit bidders to use
aggressive amounts of debt financing as occurred during the 2004 to 2007
buyout boom. By the end of 2006, private equity firms were routinely
outbidding strategic bidders, with LBOs representing over twenty-five
percent of all acquisitions for the year. 12 To the extent private equity firms'
more aggressive use of debt accounted for their competitive advantage, debt
financing may have impeded allocational efficiency in the recent takeover
wave.
To be sure, any such conclusion must necessarily be a qualified one. As
shown below, private equity firms generally form their valuations of targets
based on both the benefits of significant debt financing as well as the
operating efficiencies they expect to realize from a takeover. But unless we
take financing seriously, takeover scholarship will continue to conclude
wrongly that the highest priced offer is necessarily the optimal offer.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the basic principles of
corporate finance that motivate this Article-namely, the power of debt
11. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).
12. Kenneth Klee, Finding the Mark, Deal, Jan. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.thedeal.com (paid subscription required).
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financing to increase the value of a firm and the reasons why firms differ in
their willingness to use it. Part II then examines the implications of these
two principles of finance on takeover analysis. Using standard valuation
modeling, Part II first illustrates how debt financing affects how a bidder
values a target and how the relative use of debt financing among bidders
can affect bidding outcomes. Turning from valuation theory to takeover
practice, Part II then argues that the recent success of private equity firms in
outbidding traditional strategic bidders may very well have arisen from
their greater willingness to use debt financing, especially when combined
with a more entrepreneurial approach to LBOs that emerged in the late
1990s and the remarkably liquid credit markets that characterized 2004 to
2007.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT FINANCING AND FIRM VALUE
Consider for a moment a basic question confronting the managers of
every firm: what is the best way to finance the firm's operations? After all,
employees must be paid, equipment must be purchased and repaired, and
projects must be financed. If a firm is profitable, the decision might seem
easy: simply use any profits that the firm has accumulated over time. On
the other hand, perhaps the firm lacks sufficient profits, or its investors
demand these accumulated profits be distributed to them as dividends.
Consequently, a manager may frequently have to consider external sources
of financing such as taking out a bank loan or selling the firm's securities.
Among these options, which is the optimal decision?
A. The (Un)Importance of Capital Structure in Perfect Markets:
The Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Theorem
For much of the twentieth century, conventional finance theory suggested
that managers would be well advised to use some degree of debt financing.
The reason stemmed from the fact that debt represents a contractual, fixed
claim on a firm's cash flows, allowing money to be borrowed at lower rates
than if a firm has to raise funds from equity investors such as stockholders.
In contrast to a lender, an equity investor has no fixed claim on a
company's cash flows and will therefore demand a higher rate of return for
any investment. Of course, large amounts of debt financing might create an
enhanced risk of financial distress for the firm if it were unable to meet its
payment obligations. Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom held that
"debt-financing should be 'cheaper' than equity-financing if not carried too
far." 13
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller challenged this
conventional wisdom by postulating that a firm's value and its cost of
capital are independent of its capital structure, in particular its ratio of debt
13. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory ofInvestment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 277 (1958).
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to equity financing. 14 This theory, often referred to as the Modigliani-
Miller irrelevance theorem (or MM), is one of the most widely known
theories of corporate finance, for which both scholars would later be
awarded the Nobel Prize in economics. 15 Together with the capital asset
pricing model and the efficient market hypothesis, it represents a
cornerstone in the development of modem finance.16
At first blush, the theorem makes considerable intuitive sense. Why
should a firm be able to increase its value by simply changing the way it
divvies up the various claims on its cash flows? As an illustration, consider
the effect of a proposed debt restructuring on BigCo, a hypothetical
publicly traded company.17  For simplicity, assume BigCo pays no
corporate income taxes and that it has the following attributes. First, it has
outstanding 100,000 shares of common stock and no debt. Second, under
normal economic conditions, BigCo generates $125,000 in annual operating
income, all of which is paid out to its shareholders via dividends of $1.25
per share. 18  In an economic boom, however, it expects that annual
operating income would increase to $175,000 (resulting in dividends of
$1.75 per share), and in an economic slump, annual operating income
would decrease to $75,000 (dividends of $0.75 per share). Lastly, BigCo's
shares trade at $10 prior to the restructuring, which means BigCo has a
market valuation of $1,000,000 ($10 x 100,000 shares). If the market
assumes that BigCo will continue to operate under normal economic
conditions, this share price also indicates that investors are demanding a
return of 12.5% for their equity investment.1 9
Now assume that BigCo decides to alter its debt-to-equity ratio by taking
out a loan for $500,000 and using the proceeds to repurchase 50,000 shares.
Would this restructuring increase the market value of the firm? That is,
14. See generally id.
15. Merton H. Miller shared the prize in 1990 with Harry Markowitz (generally
considered the pioneer of modem portfolio theory) and William F. Sharpe (creator of the
capital asset pricing model). Franco Modigliani had previously been awarded a Nobel Prize
in 1985 for his analyses of saving and of financial markets.
16. See Ronald J. Gilson & Renier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715, 717-19 (2003).
17. The example that follows is based on a similar example found in Richard A. Brealey,
Stewart C. Myers & Alan J. Marcus, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance 396-400 (4th ed.
2004).
18. Because we are assuming BigCo pays no corporate level income tax, BigCo can pay
out all of its operating income as dividends. This assumption is relaxed below.
19. With no growth and perpetual dividends expected, stockholders' expected return on
investment can be calculated using a simple dividend-discount valuation model. In general
terms, this valuation model is a form of discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, which is
widely used to value financial assets and firms. See Aswath Damodaran, Corporate Finance:
Theory and Practice 750 (2001). All DCF methodologies involve forecasting future cash
flows and then discounting them to present value at a discount rate that reflects their
riskiness. See id. Under the dividend-discount model, the price of a single share should
reflect expected dividends per year (DIV) divided by the firm's cost of equity capital (r):
Price Per Share = DIV/r. Given a $10 price per share and expected dividends of $1.25 in
perpetuity, we can solve for r by simply rearranging terms: r = $1.25/S1.
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would the market value of the total claims on BigCo's assets-its
outstanding debt with a face value of $500,000 and its outstanding 50,000
shares-now exceed $1,000,000? MM's "Proposition I" provided a
mathematical explanation of why it could not. Indeed, the conclusion might
seem obvious: the restructuring did nothing to change BigCo's underlying
income stream. It should still expect to earn $125,000 in operating income
in normal economic conditions; $175,000 in good economic conditions; and
$75,000 in poor economic conditions. The only change was the financing
mix. How could the firm's value possibly have increased?
Yet on closer inspection, Proposition I was not necessarily an obvious
conclusion, and it was met with considerable skepticism when it was first
published.20 While the restructuring would not change BigCo's revenue
stream, it would result in two changes to BigCo that might appear to
enhance its value. First, it replaced expensive equity with cheaper debt in
its capital structure. Because debt has a senior claim on BigCo's assets in
bankruptcy, it represents a less risky investment, so BigCo should be able to
obtain an interest rate less than the 12.5% rate of return demanded by its
equity investors. If BigCo could obtain a rate of 10%, for example, it
should have an overall lower cost of capital, thus lowering the financing
costs of future projects and investments. Second, as shown in Figure 2, the
additional borrowing would increase BigCo's expected earnings per share
from $1.25 to $1.50 in normal economic conditions.
Figure 2: Effect of BigCo Debt Restructuring
Prior to Debt Restructuring After Debt Restructuring
State of the Economy: Slump Normal Boom Slump Normal Boom
Operating Income: $75,000 $125,000 $175,000 $75,000 $125,000 $175,000
Interest Payments
on Debt: $0 $0 $0 ($50,000) ($50,000) ($50,000)
Equity Earnings: $75,000 $125,000 $175,000 $25,000 $75,000 $125,000
Outstanding Shares: 100,000 100,000 100,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Earnings Per Share: $0.75 $1.25 $1.75 $0.50 $1.50 $2.50
Modigliani and Miller demonstrated the economic irrelevance of each of
these changes. First, with regard to the increase in earnings per share, the
increase comes at a price: greater earnings volatility. Whereas prior to the
debt restructuring each share would receive $0.75 in a slump and $1.75 in a
boom, after the restructuring each would receive $0.50 and $2.50,
respectively. In other words, the effect of the leveraged restructuring would
be to double the magnitude of the upside and downside return on BigCo's
shares. It turns out that if shareholders of the all-equity BigCo wanted this
20. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J.
Econ. Persp. 99, 100 (1988) (discussing the significant "[s]kepticism about the practical
force of our invariance proposition" at the time it was published in 1958).
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type of income volatility, they could easily have obtained it through
borrowing on their own and reinvesting the proceeds in BigCo's stock.21
Consequently, if BigCo effects the restructuring, it is not achieving
anything for investors that they could not do already, underscoring why the
restructuring alone cannot increase BigCo's value.22
For similar reasons, the restructuring will not result in an overall lower
cost of capital for BigCo. If the restructuring doubles the volatility of
BigCo's earnings per share, rational equity investors will demand a higher
rate of return to compensate for this increased risk. Recall that investors
previously demanded a return on investment of 12.5%, which represented a
premium of 2.5% above the market interest rate. If BigCo doubles the
volatility of its earnings per share, rational equity investors will require
double this premium, resulting in a required rate of return of 15% (10% +
2.5% x 2). The result is entirely consistent with Proposition I: if dividends
are expected to be $1.50 per year after the restructuring, a required rate of
return of 15% would result in a price per share of $10.23 The total market
value of BigCo's debt and equity securities therefore remains at $1,000,000
($500,000 debt + $500,000 equity securities), as postulated by Proposition
I. Moreover, while $500,000 of BigCo's capital structure would consist of
debt bearing interest at 10%, the other half-50,000 shares trading at $10
per share-would consist of equity for which investors now demand a 15%
rate of return. As a result, the weighted average cost of capital for BigCo
would be 12.5%, the same as prior to the restructuring. 24 This second
conclusion-that a firm's average cost of capital will remain the same
regardless of its capital structure-constituted MM's "Proposition II."' 25
Figure 3 provides an illustration.
21. For example, under the assumptions utilized in the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
theorem, an investor with $10 to invest could go to a bank, borrow $10 at 10% interest and
then invest $20 in two shares of the all-equity BigCo. Holding these two shares the investor
would expect annual dividends of $1.50 in an economic slump ($0.75 x 2), $2.50 in regular
economic conditions ($1.25 x 2) and $3.50 in an economic boom ($1.75 x 2). After paying
$1 in interest each year, the investor's net returns would then be identical to the returns of
investors in the recapitalized BigCo-that is $0.50 in an economic slump, $1.50 in normal
economic conditions, and $2.50 in an economic boom. This opportunity for "homemade"
leverage was a critical insight of Modigliani and Miller's paper.
22. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 13, at 270 ("We conclude therefore that levered
companies cannot command a premium over unlevered companies because investors have
the opportunity of putting the equivalent leverage into their portfolio directly by borrowing
on personal account.").
23. Again, this price was obtained using the dividend-discount model: Price = $1.50/
.15 =$10.
24. The weighted average cost of capital reflects the average cost of capital for a firm in
light of its capital structure. Stated differently, it represents the average return on investment
that a firm must generate in its operations in order to keep all of its investors satisfied. See
Brealey, Myers & Marcus, supra note 17, at 322.
25. In the words of Modigliani and Miller, "[T]he average cost of capital to any firm is
completely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure




B. Capital Structure and Firm Value in the Real World
The two MM propositions hold true, however, only if several simplifying
assumptions are made. These include the existence of perfectively efficient
capital markets as well as the absence of both taxes and bankruptcy costs. 26
Relaxing any of these assumptions dramatically changes the results of the
propositions. Perhaps most importantly, in a world with corporate taxes,
debt financing can increase the value of a firm to its shareholders because
the interest that a company pays on debt is tax deductible. 27
Consider again BigCo's proposed restructuring, but now assume that
BigCo's profits were taxed at a marginal rate of 35%. Prior to the
restructuring, BigCo's annual operating income of $125,000 would be
reduced by 35% ($43,750), resulting in after-tax income of $81,250. If
equity investors continue to demand a 12.5% rate of return, the company
would then be valued at $81,250 / .125, or $650,000.28 After the debt
restructuring, BigCo would have to use $50,000 of its annual operating
income to make interest payments on debt, but this $50,000 would reduce
BigCo's taxable income from $125,000 to $75,000. As a result, BigCo
would pay only $26,250 in corporate taxes ($75,000 x 35%), leaving
$48,750 for its equity investors. Assuming equity investors would now
require a 15% rate of return as discussed previously, the company's equity
would be valued at $48,750/0.15, or $325,000. Given BigCo's outstanding
debt with a face value of $500,000, BigCo's overall valuation would
26. See id. at 267-68.
27. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2000) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid
or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."). For a general discussion of the
deductibility of corporate interest payments, see I Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice,
Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 5.03 (2007).
28. Because BigCo's income is assumed to continue in perpetuity, the dividend discount
valuation model can be utilized to value the entire firm. See supra note 19.
Figure 3: MM Proposition II
requity = return demanded by equity investors
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therefore total $825,000 ($500,000 + $325,000)-an increase of $175,000
in firm value achieved simply by replacing equity with debt. At base, the
new debt would have created a wealth transfer from the U.S. Treasury to
BigCo, thereby increasing the value of the company. 29
Thus, the interest "tax shield" provided by debt can constitute a
potentially valuable asset that increases the more a company uses debt to
finance its operations. In modeling the effect of corporate taxes on their
irrelevance theorem, Modigliani and Miller therefore significantly modified
their original propositions in 1963.30 As Miller would later summarize,
This time ... the value of the firm (in the sense of the sum of the values
of the private, nongovernmental claims) is not independent of the
debt/equity division in the capital structure. In general, thanks to the
deductibility of interest, the purely private claims will increase in value as
the debt ratio increases. In fact, under conditions which can by no means
be dismissed out of hand as implausible, we showed that the value of the
private claims might well have no well-defined interior maximum. The
optimal capital structure might be all debt! 31
In the real world then, the question is not whether firms can increase value
by replacing equity with debt-it is why firms do not have an all-debt
capital structure in the first place.
C. Explaining Firms' Divergent Financing Decisions
From this basic question, four decades of finance research has emerged
examining why firms have such radically different capital structures. 32
Today, financial economists remain thoroughly divided on this "capital
structure puzzle," 33 with some believing that a single explanatory theory
may never emerge. As one prominent economist has noted, "There is no
universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one."34
29. The new debt would also result in an overall lower cost of capital for BigCo.
Because interest is tax deductible, the government effectively pays 35% of BigCo's interest
cost meaning that BigCo only needs to earn the after-tax rate of interest on its debt to keep
its debt investors satisfied. In other words, BigCo's effective cost of debt decreases from
10% in a world without taxes to 6.5% (i.e., 10% x (1 - 35%)) in a world with taxes. See
generally Brealey, Myers & Marcus, supra note 17, at 405-06.
30. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and
the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1963).
31. See Miller, supra note 20, at 112.
32. See Glen T. Ryen, Geraldo M. Vasconcellos & Richard J. Kish, Capital Structure
Decisions: What Have We Learned?, 40 Bus. Horizons 41, 41 (1997) ("The determination
of an optimal capital structure has been one of the most contentious topics in the finance
literature since Modigliani and Miller (MM) introduced their capital structure irrelevancy
propositions in the American Economic Review in 1958.").
33. See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, The Capital Structure Puzzle: The
Evidence Revisited, 17 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8, 8 (2005) (describing the theoretical debate
and noting that "[w]hat makes the capital structure debate especially intriguing is that the
theories lead to such different, and in some ways diametrically opposed, decisions and
outcomes").
34. Stewart C. Myers, Capital Structure, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 81, 81 (2001).
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While a full review of these competing theories is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is important to recognize a common theme underlying virtually
all of them: firms are predicted to differ in their financing decisions for
reasons that are entirely rational. This conclusion emerges from even a
cursory review of the three primary theories used to explain firms' capital
structure decisions: the agency cost theory, the pecking order theory, and
the trade-off theory.
1. The Agency Cost Theory
From the moment Modigliani and Miller published their tax-adjusted
Proposition I, its unpleasant implications for corporate managers were clear.
According to Miller,
It suggested that the high bond ratings of [lightly leveraged] companies,
in which the management took so much pride, may actually have been a
sign of their incompetence; that the managers were leaving too much of
their stockholders' money on the table in the form of unnecessary
corporate income tax payments. 35
That low debt levels might reflect mismanagement was later formalized by
Michael Jensen with even more ominous overtones. 36 Given the agency
costs associated with the management of publicly traded corporations,
shareholders should expect corporate managers to engage in self-serving
behavior such as using cash flows to secure higher salaries, perquisites, or
job security. Moreover, contracts were an inadequate corrective,
particularly where managers used company cash flows to pursue seemingly
productive-albeit inefficient-investments.
For Jensen, a low debt level at a public company-or the retention of
"financial slack"-was thus intimately related to the agency costs of public
corporations. It allowed managers to pursue negative net present value
investments, to expand perquisites, and to make ill-advised acquisitions.
"The problem," according to Jensen, "is how to motivate managers to
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or
wasting it on organization inefficiencies." 37  If the absence of debt
contributed to this problem, Jensen hypothesized, one solution would be to
radically increase a firm's leverage. Under an increased debt burden,
managers would have significant incentives to generate cash flows and
would be forced to scale back all but the most promising investments. In
short, by obligating a company to make interest payments, debt could help
alleviate the agency costs of public ownership. 38 Indeed, Jensen's theory
helped explain the initial wave of LBOs during the 1980s, which were
largely considered "shock therapy designed to cut back wasteful
35. Miller, supra note 20, at 112.
36. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323 (1986).
37. Id. at 323.
38. See id. at 324.
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investment, force sale of underutilized assets, and generally to strengthen
management's incentives to maximize value to investors." 39  Under this
agency cost paradigm then, a firm's financing decision should reflect the
extent to which it suffers from the agency costs associated with the
separation of ownership and control.
2. The Pecking Order Theory
Not all theories of capital structure proceed on the assumption that firms'
divergent financing decisions arise from agency costs. On the contrary,
most of the academic debate has centered on theories that assume loyal
managers who adopt capital structures aimed to maximize shareholder
welfare. Under the "pecking order" theory, for instance, firm managers are
assumed to act in the best interests of its current shareholders and seek to
minimize the negative wealth effects to a firm associated with raising
external capital.40 These negative wealth effects arise from the fact that an
information asymmetry exists between a firm's managers and its
prospective investors regarding a firm's prospects, which creates a severe
adverse selection problem for prospective investors, particularly for equity
investors. Equity investors will recognize that even well-meaning
managers have an incentive to sell equity securities to the public when
managers believe the market overvalues their firm. Consequently, outside
investors will interpret a new equity issuance as a signal that management
believes its shares are overvalued, and investors will therefore discount the
market prices of firms that issue equity securities-a prediction that has
been confirmed in numerous studies. 41
In general, because debt investors can minimize this adverse selection
problem through debt contracts, these negative wealth effects should be
greater for equity issuances than for debt issuances and can be avoided
entirely if a company can use internal funds to finance its new investments.
Accordingly, the theory suggests that loyal managers will first look to
internal funds before turning to external financing, and to the extent
external financing is needed, managers will issue debt rather than equity.42
This "pecking order" is consistent with the general pattern in which U.S.
corporations have historically chosen to finance their operations.
Specifically, most of the aggregate gross investment by U.S. corporations
39. Myers, supra note 34, at 98.
40. The pecking order theory was originally articulated by Stewart Myers and Nicholas
Majluf. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 187
(1984).
41. See, e.g., Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, 15
J. Fin. Econ. 61, 70-74 (1986) (finding an average fall in price of about 3% of the preissue
market capitalization of firms issuing equity securities); Nathalie Dierkens, Information
Asymmetry and Equity Issues, 26 J. Fin. Quantitative Analysis 181, 188 (1991) (finding a
price drop at the announcement of equity issuance to be greater among firms that have large
measures of information asymmetry).
42. See Myers & Majluf, supra note 40, at 189.
1988 [Vol. 76
TA KING FINANCE SERIOUSLY
has been financed from internal cash flows, with external financing
accounting for less than twenty percent of corporate financing needs, the
vast majority of which has consisted of debt.43 Like the agency cost
paradigm, it also suggests firms will differ significantly in their financing
decisions. For instance, it predicts profitable firms will often borrow less
than nonprofitable firms, notwithstanding the fact that profitable firms have
the most to gain from the tax shield of debt.44
3. The Trade-Off Theory
Likewise, the trade-off theory also assumes that managers use capital
structure to maximize shareholder welfare and predicts firms will vary
widely in their financing decisions.45 In general, the theory models a firm's
optimal capital structure as one that maximizes the benefits of debt against
its costs. While debt might provide a valuable tax shield and might reduce
agency problems, the issuance of debt-particularly large amounts of
debt-comes with both direct and indirect costs. For instance, a highly
leveraged firm will have a higher likelihood of financial distress given that
a setback in anticipated earnings may result in an inability to make interest
payments. A highly leveraged firm might even have to seek bankruptcy
protection or a protracted renegotiation of its debt. Either scenario would
entail considerable direct costs that must be paid from the firm's assets,
causing investors to discount the value of the firm by the present value of
these anticipated costs. 4 6
Moreover, even if a highly leveraged firm can avoid these scenarios,
there are indirect costs of debt that may adversely affect firm value. For
example, suppliers may worry that they will not be paid, customers may
fear the firm will not honor its contractual commitments, and key
employees may have concerns about layoffs and begin to look for
alternative employment. This is to say nothing about the well-known
conflict of interest between equity investors and debt investors within a
leveraged firm.47 As a result of this conflict, when a firm increases its
43. See Myers, supra note 34, at 82.
44. See id. at 93.
45. See id. at 94.
46. See id. at 88-89. One study of troubled, highly leveraged firms found that the direct
and indirect costs of financial distress amounted to 10% to 20% of a firm's predistress
market value. Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not
Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became
Distressed, 53 J. Fin. 1443 (1998).
47. When a leveraged firm nears financial distress, there may be instances when
stockholders can benefit at the expense of debt holders. For instance, stockholders may have
an incentive to use a firm's remaining assets to pursue negative net present value projects
that promise significant returns, albeit at extraordinary risk. The reason stems from the fact
that if the gamble turns out to be a success, the stockholders will share in all of the upside
after satisfying the firm's debt claims. If the gamble turns out to be a failure, however, they
have lost nothing given that the creditors of the firm would have received all of the firm's
assets in a liquidation. In effect, stockholders have an incentive to gamble with the debt
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leverage, debt investors will demand increasingly onerous protective
covenants as well as higher interest rates, which may adversely affect a
firm's freedom to pursue promising investment opportunities. For all of
these reasons, loyal managers will seek a target debt level that balances the
benefits of debt against its costs as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: The Trade-Off Theory of Capital Structure
Value of firm (TI) Value of firm
Actual value of under MM with
firm corporate taxes
and debt
.. . Present Value
Maximum -of financialfMaximum value distress costs
Value of firm i Present value of tax
with no debt shields of debt
0 Debt (D)
D* Optimal amount of debt
The task of finding this "target" debt ratio is made all the more difficult
by the fact that the costs and benefits of debt will affect firms in different
ways. For instance, firms operating in volatile industries will experience
significant variations in their cash flows, thus increasing the possibility of
missing a mandatory interest payment and triggering a loan default.48 For
other firms, the quality of its assets may be the primary determinant of
where to set the target debt level. For instance, public utility companies
with large holdings of tangible property and real estate generally borrow
considerably more than software companies whose primary assets consist of
intellectual property and goodwill. 49 The reason undoubtedly relates to the
fact that tangible, real property can more easily be liquidated in the event of
a bankruptcy than the intangible property of a technology growth company.
Not surprisingly, firms within particular industries tend to cluster around
particular debt-to-equity ratios.50
holders' money. For a summary of the types of conflicts that can arise among debt holders
and stockholders, see Myers, supra note 34, at 96-98.
48. See, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure:
Theory and Evidence, 39 J. Fin. 857, 869-76 (1984) (finding that the volatility of a firm's
earnings is inversely related to its level of debt financing).
49. See Brealey, Myers & Marcus, supra note 17, at 394 (noting the average debt-to-
firm value ratio of 7% for software companies compared with 65% for utility companies).
50. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. Fin.
297 (1991) (summarizing the findings of four studies that concluded that specific industries
have a common leverage ratio, which over time is relatively stable); see also Gay B. Hatfield
et al., The Determination of Optimal Capital Structure: The Effect of Firm and Industry
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Even within a particular industry, unique, firm-specific characteristics
may significantly influence the cost-benefit analysis of debt financing. 51
Most notably, a firm's profitability directly affects its tax burden and,
consequently, the size of the potential tax shields available from taking on
more debt.52 Similarly, a firm's particular business strategy might lessen
the financial distress costs otherwise associated with a particular leverage
ratio. For example, Srinivasan Balakrishnan and Isaac Fox found that even
a firm's decision to invest in a strong advertising campaign might affect its
financial distress costs. 53  By demonstrating a firm's commitment to
maintain a positive brand image, Balakrishnan and Fox hypothesized, these
investments should signal a firm's commitment to honor its debt
obligations, given that a firm's reputation can be seriously damaged if it
defaults on a loan. Firms that invest in this type of intangible asset should
therefore have a lower risk of default-and consequently lower financial
distress costs-notwithstanding the fact that large advertising investments
create the very type of intangible assets that are difficult to value in a
reorganization. 54 Consistent with this theory, Balakrishnan and Fox found
that firms with large advertising investments had greater leverage ratios
than other firms having comparable fixed assets, growth opportunities, and
income volatility.55
4. Summary
In summary, after forty years of finance research, it is now clear that a
firm's financing choice can affect firm value. What remains unclear is how
managers decide which type of financing to use. On this issue, it appears
that rational managers will often disagree about the optimal level of debt
and equity, a fact reflected in the diversity of capital structures in the
current marketplace. Moreover, one need not subscribe to any particular
capital structure theory to appreciate the fact that divergent capital
structures among firms is simply a fact of corporate life.
Once again, the HCA buyout is instructive. Recall that although HCA's
underlying business would remain largely the same after an LBO as after a
leveraged recapitalization, Merrill Lynch concluded that, as a privately held
company, HCA could take on almost twice as much debt than if it remained
Debt Ratios on Market Value, 7 J. Fin. & Strategic Decisions 1 (1994) (summarizing
literature examining the relationship between industry and debt-to-equity ratios).
51. See, e.g., Srinivasan Balakrishnan & Isaac Fox, Asset Specificity, Firm
Heterogeneity and Capital Structure, 14 Strategic Mgmt. J. 3, 11 (1993) (finding that firm
specific characteristics account for approximately 50% of the variance in leverage ratios
while industry characteristics account for only 5% to 10%).
52. See Sheridan Titman & Roberto Wessels, The Determinants of Capital Structure
Choice, 43 J. Fin. 1 (1988) (finding a significant negative relationship between firm
profitability and leverage ratios); John K. Wald, How Firm Characteristics Affect Capital
Structure: An International Comparison, 22 J. Fin. Res. 161 (1999) (same).
53. See Balakrishnan & Fox, supra note 51, at 11-14.




publicly held.56 Exactly why Merrill Lynch drew this conclusion is unclear,
but it is certainly consistent with a growing empirical literature that has
documented the tendency of privately held firms to use considerably more
debt than publicly held firms, even after controlling for other firm-specific
factors associated with greater leverage. 57 It is also consistent with any of
the three theories discussed above. Under an agency cost theory, for
instance, a private equity firm might be better positioned than HCA's
dispersed public shareholders to monitor management to ensure they extract
sufficient cash flows to meet the larger debt burden. 58 Likewise, under a
pecking order theory, a private firm might seek greater debt financing
because the illiquidity of privately held stock significantly increases the
costs of financing operations through equity issuances. 59 Lastly, publicly
traded firms may experience higher financial distress costs for highly
leveraged capital structures due to the information asymmetry between a
company's dispersed shareholders and its management.
60
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKEOVER ANALYSIS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
As the foregoing analysis indicates, debt financing provides a potentially
powerful way for managers to increase the value of a firm. For similar
56. See infra text accompanying notes 4-5.
57. See generally Rick H. Mull & Drew B. Winters, IPOs, Public Market Access, and
Firm Capital Structure, 20 J. Econ. Fin. 99, 106 (Supp. 1996) (finding that after controlling
for other determinants of capital structure choice, private firms have significantly greater
debt ratios than public firms); Chris J. Muscarella & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Efficiency and
Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs, 45 J. Fin. 1389, 1408-09 (1990)
(finding that firms that go public following a leveraged buyout (LBO) dramatically reduce
their leverage ratios following the public offering); see also Omer Brav, How Does Access
to the Public Capital Market Affect Firms' Capital Structure? 2 (Nov. 22, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that private firms have leverage ratios
that are approximately 40% higher, on average, than their public counterparts).
58. See supra Part I.C.1.
59. See supra Part I.C.2.
60. See, e.g., Part I.C.3. Specifically, these higher costs may stem from the relationship
between a firm's credit rating and its perceived risk of financial distress by shareholders.
When a public company significantly increases its debt ratio, the three primary credit ratings
agencies will ordinarily downgrade the company's credit rating in the course of reviewing
the new issue. See Darren J. Kisgen, Credit Ratings and Capital Structure, 61 J. Fin. 1035,
1038-39 (2006). Because these agencies will have access to highly confidential information
regarding the company, shareholders commonly interpret the downgrade as a signal
regarding the firm's ability to service the debt. As ratings are differentiated at discrete levels
(AAA, AA, BBB, etc.), companies with the same ratings may be pooled together with all the
companies in the pool perceived to be just eligible for the particular rating. The result is a
discrete, and often, dramatic increase in the perceived financial distress costs associated with
the new leverage level. Id. In contrast, shareholders in privately held firms should have
greater access to information concerning the firm's operating performance and potential
default risk, allowing for a more accurate assessment of the firm's financial distress risk.
This is especially true in a firm that has undergone an LBO, where a company's private
equity investors have direct access to management. Indeed, this ability to monitor
management directly (especially when combined with the equity incentives discussed below)
further allows a company undergoing an LBO to reduce the financial distress risk of a highly
leveraged capital structure. See infra text accompanying note 89.
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reasons, a bidder that finances an acquisition with debt rather than equity
can significantly increase its ultimate valuation of a target. In effect, the
bidder will have chosen to recapitalize the target with debt, thereby
lowering the target's cost of capital due to the deductibility of interest
payments as discussed in Part I.B. Yet for the same reason, the fact that
firms have different preferences for debt financing allows this form of
financing to affect bidding outcomes. In particular, in a bidding contest for
a target, the fact that one bidder chooses to be more aggressive with debt
financing may very well give it a competitive edge over other bidders,
regardless of whether it is the bidder that could best put the target's assets
to productive use.
As this part reveals, the conclusion can be illustrated by examining basic
valuation theory as well as the experience of real life bidders during the
takeover wave that lasted from 2004 through the summer of 2007. In the
process, this part suggests the need for a fundamental rethinking of the long
tradition in takeover scholarship of advocating legal doctrines that ensure a
target in a takeover contest is acquired by the bidder willing to pay the most
for it. Given the power of debt financing to affect bidding outcomes, such
doctrines may actually promote suboptimal takeovers in certain contexts.
A. Subsidized Acquisitions: How Debt Financing
Affects Bidder Valuations
Consider again the case of BigCo except now assume that BigCo's
management has decided to put the company up for sale. As in the original
example, BigCo has no debt outstanding, has the same economic attributes
discussed previously, and is subject to a corporate income tax of 35%. For
simplicity, let us further assume there are only two potential buyers
interested in BigCo: ManagementCo and StrategyCo. ManagementCo
represents a group of BigCo's senior executives who are proposing a
management buyout. The group anticipates no postacquisition synergies or
cost savings, believing instead that BigCo will simply maintain its current
level of annual pretax operating income of $125,000 for the foreseeable
future. StrategyCo, in contrast, represents BigCo's primary competitor who
hopes to achieve considerable operating synergies through a merger. In
particular, it believes it can increase BigCo's operating income by 3% per
year forever. Thus, from the perspective of allocational efficiency,
StrategyCo is clearly the bidder that can put BigCo's assets to the more
productive use.
Who will actually put forth the best price? It depends on how each
finances its bid. If ManagementCo is a typical management buyout, we can
expect it to use a high degree of debt financing in its acquisition, effectively
recapitalizing BigCo with more debt. As a result, ManagementCo will be
able to utilize the implicit government subsidy provided by the resulting tax
deductions when it forms its valuation of BigCo. StrategyCo, in contrast,
may be at a competitive disadvantage in bidding if it is unable or unwilling
to finance its offer with debt. For instance, if StrategyCo is a software
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company that uses no debt in its operations, 61 StrategyCo would finance its
bid with all equity, resulting in an ultimate valuation of $880,921 using a
standard discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis.62 Even though this value
represents a premium of 36% to BigCo's existing market value,
ManagementCo would be able to beat it by obtaining a loan commitment of
$660,000 and financing the rest of the acquisition consideration through
equity contributions. 63 Assuming ManagementCo were to keep this debt
outstanding after the acquisition, the present value of the resulting tax
shields would be $231,000,64 allowing ManagementCo to put forth a
maximum bid of $881,000 (again, using a standard DCF analysis). 65
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing low leverage levels of
software firms).
62. This valuation was obtained using the Gordon growth model, which is one of the
oldest methods for valuing firms. See Damodaran, supra note 19, at 129. In general, the
model is a modified form of the simple dividend-discount formula, supra note 19, and is
appropriate to use where an all-equity firm's cash flows are assumed to grow at a constant
rate. The formula can be expressed as [(last annual cash flows) x (1 + growth rate)]/(cost of
equity - growth rate). For purposes of valuing BigCo, the perpetual stream of cash flows to
be expected would equal BigCo's last full year of net operating income after taxes ($81,250,
see supra text accompanying note 28), and assuming nothing has changed the underlying
risk of BigCo's business, BigCo's cost of equity would still equal 12.5%. See supra text
accompanying note 19. Accordingly, the Gordon growth model would calculate the
discounted present value of BigCo as follows: (81,250 x 1.03)/(.125 - .03) = $880,921.
Because $880,921 represents the value of all anticipated future cash flows from BigCo
discounted to present value, it should be the maximum price StrategyCo should pay for
BigCo. For a general discussion of the Gordon growth model, see Damodaran, supra note
19, at 129-30.
63. Although such a loan would be large in magnitude, it would be well within the range
of debt multiples used in LBOs during 2006. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
64. The present value of the tax shields can be calculated by discounting to present value
the anticipated annual tax savings resulting from BigCo's interest payments. Given the
assumption that this debt would remain outstanding forever and given a 35% tax rate, BigCo
could expect to save each year $660,000 x (rate of interest) x 35%. Moreover, because tax
shields are largely assumed to have the same risk as that of the interest payments generating
them, the most common assumption is to discount the tax shields at the rate of interest. See
Brealey, Myers & Marcus, supra note 17, at 403-04. As a result, the actual interest rate
becomes irrelevant for purposes of calculating the present value of the tax shields, and the
method for calculating the present value of tax shields is simplified as (tax rate) x (debt
outstanding). See id. In the case of ManagementCo's bid for BigCo, this can be
demonstrated by using the following perpetuity formula: (660,000 x (r-) x .35) / (f) =
$660,000 x .35 = $231,000. The simplified formula (tax rate x debt) will be utilized in the
remainder of this Article for calculating the present value of tax shields.
65. This value was obtained using the adjusted present value (APV) methodology, which
is generally recognized as the optimal DCF analysis to use when a bidder plans to make a
significant modification to a target's capital structure in connection with an acquisition. See
Josh Lerner & Felda Hardymoon, Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Casebook 203-05
(2002). In general, the APV method begins by valuing a target on the assumption that it will
be financed entirely with equity and then adding to this value the expected value of any
changes to the target's capital structure. See generally Timothy A. Luehrman, Using APV: A
Better Tool for Valuing Operations, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1997, at 3. In our example,
the APV method would thus add the present value of the anticipated tax shields arising from
ManagementCo's financing structure ($231,000, as calculated in supra note 64) to the value
of BigCo assuming ManagementCo financed it with all equity. Because ManagementCo
expects no change in BigCo's cash flows after the acquisition, this latter figure would equal
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Consequently, even without any change to BigCo's preexisting cash flows,
ManagementCo could win the bidding contest.
To be sure, StrategyCo could avoid this problem if it anticipated larger
operating synergies from the acquisition. Moreover, there is only so much
debt ManagementCo could seek to use, thereby placing an upper limit on
the value of the tax shields. For instance, assuming a corporate income tax
of 35%, the maximum theoretical amount of debt that ManagementCo
could use would be $1,000,000, creating a maximum tax shield of
$350,000.66 As Figure 5 shows, ManagementCo's willingness to use this
level of debt financing would therefore allow ManagementCo to match any
bid by StrategyCo assuming StrategyCo used a permanent annual growth
rate of 4% or less, but not if StrategyCo modeled its valuation of BigCo
using a permanent annual growth rate of more than 4%.67
Figure 5:
Comparison of ManagementCo and StrategyCo Valuations of BigCo
S4,000,000.00
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StrategyCo's Anticipated Growth Rate
Yet even assuming StrategyCo could significantly increase BigCo's
operating income, the foregoing discussion oversimplifies how
ManagementCo and StrategyCo would likely model their valuations in at
least two important respects. First, while StrategyCo might reasonably
assume a significant increase in BigCo's rate of growth in the near term, it
is less tenable to maintain this assumption for long periods of time.
$650,000-the same valuation of the all-equity BigCo prior to the acquisition, as calculated
supra in the text accompanying note 28.
66. If the value of a firm consists of the value of its debt plus the value of its equity, see
supra text accompanying notes 19-20, $1,000,000 is the maximum amount of debt
ManagementCo could use given that, when BigCo pays no income tax, the value of BigCo is
$1,000,000, see supra text accompany notes 19-24. Stated algebraically, we can calculate
the maximum theoretical amount of debt that ManagementCo could use by setting the APV
formula for valuing BigCo equal to BigCo's aggregate firm value (i.e., the value of its debt +
equity): $650,000 + (.35 x BigCo debt) = BigCo debt + BigCo equity. By assuming that
BigCo is funded with all debt and solving for BigCo's debt, we then get the following:
BigCo debt = $650,000/.65 = $1,000,000. As in supra note 64, if ManagementCo were to
use $1,000,000 of debt financing, the resulting tax shields would be calculated by
multiplying this amount by the tax rate of 35%.
67. The valuations used in Figure 5 were derived using the same methodologies utilized
in supra notes 62 and 65, as modified to reflect StrategyCo's assumed rates of growth.
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Assuming BigCo operates in a competitive industry, competition among
firms must eventually erode above-market operating margins. 68 Moreover,
any valuation model using a constant growth rate must use a growth rate
that is less than or equal to the economy's overall growth rate. The reason
is a simple matter of mathematics: if a firm's cash flows could grow
forever at a rate that exceeded the economy's growth rate, the firm would
become the economy. 69 For firms being valued in U.S. dollars, this puts an
upper limit on the perpetual growth rate of approximately 5% to 6% per
year.7
0
Second, it is extremely unlikely that ManagementCo would anticipate
level operating income in the foreseeable future. At a minimum,
ManagementCo could expect some cost savings from taking BigCo private.
For example, as a privately held company, BigCo would be free of the
expense of complying with the reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), any listing fees required to list its
publicly traded securities, 7 1 and the enhanced litigation risk associated with
having publicly traded equity securities. 72 This appears to be especially
true following passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,73 which has
increased significantly the costs of having securities subject to the
Exchange Act reporting requirements. 74 Additionally, ManagementCo
68. See Richard Brealey & Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 66-67 (3d
ed. 1988).
69. See Damodaran, supra note 19, at 129.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report 5 (2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l .30Committee Interim ReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter
Capital Markets Report] (reporting that a typical company having approximately $200
million in market capitalization must pay about $85,000 annually to list on the New York
Stock Exchange).
72. In its closely followed study, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation cited
enhanced liability risk as a principal cause for the apparent diminished competitiveness of
U.S. capital markets. In particular, it noted that private class action settlement costs have
increased from $150 million in 1995 to $3.5 billion in 2005 (leaving out the $6.1 billion
settlement associated with the WorldCom litigation). See id. at 5. At the same time, the
committee also stressed that much of this enhanced litigation risk stemmed from more active
public enforcement actions of both a civil and criminal nature. See id. at 71-91. The
committee concluded that, in addition to the direct costs of enhanced monetary liability,
liability risk also "has the effect of engendering greater uncertainty in the marketplace about
just what is allowed, and what is not." Id. at 67. Additionally, the enhanced liability risk
appears to have increased the premiums charged to publicly traded firms for standard
directors and officers (D&O) insurance policies. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being
Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private, " 55 Emory L.J. 141, 147 (2006)
(citing a study showing that "the cost of D&O insurance has risen by 25% to 40% for
companies with healthy balance sheets, and as much as 300% to 400% for companies with
financial troubles").
73. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
74. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is widely recognized as increasing the costs of
registering securities under the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., Christian Leuz et al., Why
Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC
Deregistrations, 44 J. Acct. & Econ. (forthcoming 2008), available at
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might also expect some enhanced operating efficiencies. As noted above,
highly leveraged firms can create significant incentives among managers to
generate cash flow. For ManagementCo, this incentive should be
particularly enhanced given the increased ownership stake of BigCo's
managers in the postacquisition firm. If BigCo's managers fail to execute
their business plan, it will be their own money they have lost.
As a result of these two considerations, a more realistic understanding of
how ManagementCo and StrategyCo form their valuations of BigCo would
be to assume that both bidders expect significant short-term operating
efficiencies, followed by a lower constant growth rate. In fact, this DCF
methodology is routinely recommended by both academics and
practitioners as the preferred method to value firms. 75  Interestingly,
applying the methodology to the case of BigCo's acquisition only further
accentuates the power of the tax shields to level the playing field between
StrategyCo (high synergies) and ManagementCo (low synergies). Figure 6
sets forth the results of running sixteen DCF analyses assuming StrategyCo
used a different fixed rate of short-term growth for BigCo ranging from 0%
to 15% for a period of five years, followed by a long-term annual growth
rate of 3%. In each analysis, ManagementCo was also assumed to
anticipate a long term growth rate for BigCo of 3%, but it expected only
one-half the short-term growth rate anticipated by StrategyCo.
ManagementCo was also assumed to finance its offer at a debt level
consistent with the average of all U.S. leveraged buyouts occurring in
2006. 76 As Figure 6 illustrates, under these assumptions, StrategyCo would
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=592421 (noting that SOX has
"substantially increased the internal resources necessary to comply with the new SEC
reporting requirements, as well as the cost of retaining outside auditors and lawyers"). Much
of the increased compliance cost is related to § 404 of SOX which requires a company's
management and its outside auditors to attest to the adequacy of a company's internal
controls. See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 71, at 5 (noting that the
average cost of § 404 in 2004 was $4.36 million for an average company). In addition to
these direct costs, SOX may also entail indirect costs that result when "compliance activities
consume[] increasing amounts of executive time." Carney, supra note 72, at 151. Several
studies have suggested that these increased costs alone have encouraged an increase in the
number of publicly traded companies that have elected to become private companies since
2002. See, e.g., Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that going
private transactions have "risen dramatically in recent years" and "[o]ne must consider
whether the decision to 'go private' or to access the private equity market is a response to the
regulatory and liability costs and burdens of the public U.S. market"). Indeed, the cost of
complying with SOX is the "most frequently stated reason[] given by management in press
releases to explain why their firms are going dark." Leuz, supra, at 7; see also Carney, supra
note 72, at 149 (finding the same reasons in a sample of 13e-3 filings filed in 2004).
75. See Damodaran, supra note 19, at 131-34; see also Lerner & Hardymoon, supra
note 65, at 206-11 (describing methodology).
76. In 2006, the average debt-to-EBITDA ratio for all leveraged buyouts was 5.7. See
Average Pro Forma Adjusted Credit Statistics of Leverages Buyout Loans 2006, Standard &
Poor's M&A Stats, Dec. 2006, at 2, 2 [hereinafter S&P Leveraged Commentary]. For
simplicity, the DCF models utilized here assume a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 6.0. To ensure a
more realistic assessment of the comparative advantage of debt financing, the DCF
methodologies used in this example track closely the assumptions utilized in the analysis of a
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need to expect a short-term growth rate of at least 13% per year before it
could outbid ManagementCo.
Figure 6:
Comparison of StrategyCo and ManagementCo Valuations of BigCo
$1,600,000.00
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Admittedly, real life bidders analyze expected synergies and cost savings
with considerably more refinement than used in this example. But the
central insight offered here must apply for even these more complex
valuation models: the use of debt financing effectively subsidizes a
bidder's ultimate valuation of a target. Indeed, it is for this reason that the
present value of the tax shields arising from debt financing appear as a
fundamental element in every significant form of DCF analysis. 77 At the
same time, the long-standing debate over capital structure tells us that not
every bidder will use this subsidy to the same extent given bidders'
divergent financing policies. The result of these two factors is a de facto
subsidy that benefits some bidders but not others.
debt-financed acquisition in Luehrman, supra note 65. This includes an assumption that at
the end of year five, ManagementCo will refinance BigCo's debt with a new issue of long-
term debt at 9% (although for simplicity, the models here assume a fixed interest rate of
10%). See Luehrman, supra note 65, at 153. In contrast to Luchrman, however, the models
do not assume that BigCo's indebtedness will grow after year five as BigCo continues to
grow. See id. (assuming constant growth rate of debt of 5% per year after year five). Were
the models to use this assumption, the resulting tax shields would be even larger and the
competitive advantage of debt financing even greater than depicted in Figure 6.
77. See, e.g., Lerner & Hardymoon, supra note 65, at 199-200 ("The net present (NPV)
method is one of the most common methods of cash flow valuation.... The NPV method
incorporates the benefit of tax shields from tax-deductible interest payments in the discount
rate (i.e., the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, or WACC)."); see also id. at 203 ("[In an
APV analysis one first] consider[s] the cash flows generated by the assets of a company,
ignoring its capital structure. The savings from tax-deductible interest payments are then
valued separately.").
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B. Reconsidering the Efficiency ofAwarding Target to the Highest Bidder
In light of the power of debt financing to affect bidder valuations, the fact
that bidders' financing decisions have not played a larger role in modem
takeover scholarship is puzzling to say the least. The omission is all the
more so considering the tendency of takeover scholars to assume that the
bidder willing to pay the most for a target is the bidder best able to utilize
the target's assets as a matter of allocational efficiency. 78  Given the
importance of this assumption in takeover analysis, one might reasonably
expect considerable probing of the black box of bidder valuations.
To be sure, takeover scholarship has recognized the tax benefits of debt
financing in corporate acquisitions. 79 Those who have taken the potential
for a tax-motivated acquisition seriously, however, have largely contented
themselves that such acquisitions raise no efficiency concerns by turning to
an agency cost explanation: when a target firm is acquired in an LBO, the
target's management is generally presumed to have "failed to maximize
firm value by carrying too little debt and paying too much in taxes."'80 In
other words, such an analysis would have us believe that a lightly leveraged
bidder's inability to compete with a highly leveraged bidder is primarily
self-inflicted-a product of the agency problems that plague large, publicly
traded corporations.
Yet, as argued in Part I.C, there are considerable reasons to question
whether agency problems are the primary cause of the divergent use of debt
financing among bidders. More significantly, even if agency problems do
account for some firms' divergent financing choices, we might still be
concerned about the efficiency implications of the uneven use of debt
financing among bidders. The reason stems from the simple fact that
having a tax-efficient capital structure does not necessarily mean a bidder is
capable of putting a target's assets to the most productive use. As Google
has shown the world, even companies with remarkably inefficient capital
structures that use no debt financing can be remarkably efficient in how
they utilize resources. 8 1
78. See supra text accompanying note 10.
79. See Roberta Romano, A Guide To Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
Yale J. on Reg. 119, 134-36 (1992) (summarizing the literature); see also Alan J. Auerbach
& David Reishus, The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in Mergers and
Acquisitions 69, 81 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (examining empirical support for a tax-
motivated theory of leveraged acquisitions); Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts:
Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value, 44 J. Fin. 611 (1989) (examining tax benefits
available from leveraged management buyouts). In addition to the tax benefits of debt
financing, other benefits of debt financing that have been studied include the ability to use a
leveraged acquisition to expropriate wealth from a target company's existing bondholders,
see Romano, supra, at 137, and more benevolently, to alleviate the agency problems posed
by a target company's managers, see infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
80. Romano, supra note 79, at 134.
81. Google has historically used no debt financing to fund its operations,
notwithstanding the fact that it generates considerable operating profit and thus bears a large
income tax liability. It also uses a dual class voting structure to ensure voting control
remains in the hands of Google's cofounders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. This dual class
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Thus, whether or not bidders limit their use of debt because of loyal or
disloyal agents, the uneven use of debt financing may result in the scenario
depicted in Part II.A in which a low-synergy, high-leverage bidder outbids a
high-synergy, low-leverage bidder. Unless takeover scholarship takes
seriously the power of finance to affect bidder valuations, prevailing
takeover analyses may therefore wrongly conclude that the highest bidder is
the socially optimal bidder.
The need for a more nuanced consideration of finance in takeover
scholarship is made all the more pressing by examining the effect of
bidders' divergent financing decisions in real world takeovers. As a matter
of Delaware law, boards of directors are charged in change-in-control
takeovers with the very objective desired by adherents of the allocational
efficiency normative paradigm: "to secure the transaction offering the best
value reasonably available for the [target] stockholders." 82 Consequently,
the power of debt financing to result in inefficient takeovers is not just a
theoretical problem--default corporate law might actually be encouraging
target boards to pursue socially suboptimal bidders in certain contexts. As
the next section argues, several factors suggest that the recent buyout wave
presented the type of economic environment in which debt financing did in
fact impair allocational efficiency.
voting structure, especially when combined with its lack of debt financing, represents a
remarkably inefficient capital structure. Cf Ronald Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual
Class Companies (Nov. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=961158 (finding that managers with
greater control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are prone to waste corporate resources to
pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders). Nonetheless, by virtually any
accounting measure, Google has been remarkably efficient in deploying its assets (all figures




Google Industra S&P 500
Debt to Equity 0.00 0.20 0.56
Efficiency Measure -
Gross Margin 60.08 51.47 44.19
Operating Margin 31.42 23.26 19.59
Net Profit Margin 26.90 19.29 13.29
Return on Assets 20.64 13.54 8.83
Return on 22.36 16.50 12.84
Investment
Revenue/Employee $1,402,736 $652,703 $929,210
Reuters, Google Inc. Ratios,
http://stocks.us.reuters.com/stocks/ratios.asp?rpc=66&symbol=GOOG.O#Efficiency (last
visited Jan. 31, 2008). As discussed in Part I.C., Google is not unique in this regard; growth
firms commonly utilize low levels of debt financing.
82. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,44 (Del. 1994).
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C. An Inefficient Takeover Wave? The Buyout Boom of 2004 to 2007
To this point, the discussion has focused primarily on why the highest-
paying bidder in competitive bidding for a target may not necessarily be the
bidder best able to utilize a target's assets as a matter of valuation theory. It
remains to be seen, however, whether bidders' divergent financing
decisions actually affect allocational efficiency in the real world. After all,
if low-leverage, high-synergy bidders regularly outbid high-leverage, low-
synergy bidders, one might reasonably conclude that debt financing-
although subsidizing some bids-poses no threat to allocational efficiency
in real life takeovers.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize the significant
challenges facing any attempt to examine empirically the extent to which
debt financing might affect allocational efficiency. Basic negotiation
strategy gives a bidder little incentive to disclose to a target the full extent
of its anticipated gains from a proposed acquisition, nor are there any
affirmative legal duties to disclose these anticipated gains. The task of
identifying the most efficient bidder in a competitive auction is further
complicated by the fact that most auctions are not publicly disclosed. For a
privately held firm, its board of directors has no obligation at all to disclose
publicly the process by which it sold the company. Likewise, although
most publicly traded targets describe the sales process to its shareholders in
a publicly available proxy statement, descriptions of auctions are
notoriously vague and generally omit details of all but the winning bid.8 3
Lastly, even assuming one could identify all bidders in a competitive
auction for a target, analyzing whether a bidder anticipated using debt
financing to outbid rivals would be complicated by several factors. For
instance, a bidder might not disclose its anticipated financing of an
acquisition, 84 and even where it did, the disclosure may lack critical
information regarding how the financing might affect the bidder's valuation
of the target. Whether the bidder anticipated taking on additional debt after
the transaction closed and how quickly the bidder planned to pay off the
83. Professors Audra Boone and Harold Mulherin found that there is actually
considerably more "auction activity" involving publicly traded finns than has historically
been believed. Audra Boone & Harold Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, 62 J. Fin. 847, 847
(2007). Whereas most prior studies of auctions have limited their inquiry to the public
announcement of a takeover bid, Professors Boone and Mulherin reveal that "public
takeover activity is only the tip of the iceberg of actual takeover competition during the
1990s." Id. Rather, over half of the publicly traded targets in their study of 400 acquisitions
conducted "private takeover auction[s]" prior to announcing a negotiated transaction. Id. at
847-49. Significantly, while the auction process was revealed in a target's proxy
solicitation, details of the auction (such as bidder names, offer prices, or financing
arrangements) were not. See id. at 857.
84. In an all-cash acquisition of a publicly traded target, for example, the proxy rules do
not necessarily require a bidder to disclose the source of its acquisition financing. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2007) (Instructions to Item 14).
2008] 2001
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
debt are but two factors that could significantly affect the size of the
anticipated tax shields but which may not be disclosed by a bidder.85
1. The Traditional Pricing Gap Between Strategic Bidders and Leveraged
Buyout Firms: The Advantage of Operating Synergies
Notwithstanding these challenges, we can obtain some general
observations regarding the effect of debt financing on allocational
efficiency by examining how private equity buyers (LBO firms) have fared
in competitive auctions against publicly traded corporate buyers (strategic
bidders). 86 LBO firms represent a natural category of bidder to examine in
this regard given that their primary investment strategy is to make corporate
85. For instance, even in an LBO, it can be extremely difficult to calculate the size of a
bidder's anticipated tax shields based on the financing information disclosed at the time of
the transaction. Debt covenants traditionally require that any excess cash generated by the
acquired business be used to repay outstanding indebtedness, thus requiring a target to pay
down its debt obligations as quickly as possible. See, e.g., Carliss Baldwin, Technical Note
on LBO Valuation (A) (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-902-004, July 6, 2001), at 2.
Accordingly, these "cash sweep" provisions might reduce the size of a bidder's anticipated
tax shields. Complicating matters, however, is the fact that these provisions are generally
demanded by senior lenders; the target's management and its LBO sponsors will generally
"make every effort to eliminate or at least minimize loan principal payments in the early
years of ownership." Colin Blaydon and Fred Wainwright, The Balance Between Debt and
Added Value, FT.com, Sept. 28, 2006,
http://search.ft.com/rftArticle?queryText-the+balance+betweeb+debt+and+added&y=0&aje
=false&x=0&id=060928007405&ct=O. When lenders are forced to compete for deals as was
the case for much of 2004 to 2007, see infra text accompanying notes 141-49, lenders may
be more generous in how quickly the debt must be repaid. In fact, the competition for
leveraged loans during 2004 to 2007 resulted in lenders providing additional debt financing
after an LBO that increased the level of transaction indebtedness. See Blaydon & Wainright,
supra ("A few quarters of good post-deal financial performance will present management
with the opportunity to approach lenders to renegotiate terms and perhaps even increase the
level of debt in a 'leveraged recapitalization.' In today's generous debt markets, senior
acquisition debt has had much less stringent repayment requirements than has historically
been the case."). In many transactions, this posttransaction indebtedness was utilized to fund
a cash dividend payment to the LBO firms, thereby allowing them to recoup their initial
equity contribution (often referred to as a "dividend recap"). See, e.g., Kenneth MacFadyen,
Forget the New Year: PE Still Celebrating 2004, Buyouts, Jan. 3, 2005 ('"[W]ith the high
yield market where it is, [LBO] sponsors don't mind putting more equity up front at [an
LBO] closing, and then head back to the debt markets three to six months later and pull some
of their equity out through a recap."' (quoting Eduard Bagdasarian, managing director at
Barrington Associates)).
86. This Article uses the traditional phrase "LBO firm" rather than the more colloquial
"private equity firm" to make clear that the unit of analysis is a financial buyer who utilizes
the LBO as its primary form of investment. The term "private equity firm," in contrast, is
often associated with venture capital firms who do not engage in LBOs. The concept of a
"strategic bidder" is one that is commonly used in both the academic and industry press. See,
e.g., Paul M. Healy et al., Which Takeovers Are Profitable? Strategic or Financial?, 38
Sloan Mgmt. Rev. 45, 45 (1997) (describing strategic takeovers as "friendly transactions that
typically involved stock payment for firms in overlapping businesses"). This Article
conforms to the conventional industry usage of the term such that a "strategic bidder" refers
to any publicly traded bidder seeking an acquisition opportunity in a related industry to
realize potential operating synergies.
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acquisitions using large amounts of debt financing. Figure 7 represents the
basic structure for an LBO transaction.
Figure 7: Typical LBO Structure
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Although deal structure may vary from this basic model, almost all LBOs
will conform to the model's general contours. After raising funds from a
variety of institutional and individual investors, an LBO firm seeks out
acquisition opportunities that offer the potential for significant investment
returns. Traditionally, the ideal targets for LBOs were businesses that
generate significant cash flows and that would benefit from more
streamlined, efficient operations. For instance, during the 1980s LBO
boom, LBO firms focused on acquiring a number of large, publicly traded
corporate conglomerates that had diversified into different (and often
unrelated) industry sectors during the 1960s and 1970s.87 Following an
LBO, the LBO firm would then seek to rationalize a target's core business
by selling off unrelated divisions and curtailing operating expenses. Today,
as in the 1980s, the goal of an LBO remains largely unchanged: to create a
more valuable target in a relatively short period of time (generally five to
seven years from the original acquisition). Thereafter, the target will be
sold via an acquisition by another firm or a sale to public investors via an
initial public offering (IPO) of the target's stock. The LBO firm will then
distribute the proceeds of the sale to its investors, less approximately 20%
to 30% of the net profits, which it retains as compensation. 88
Critical to the success of an LBO is a radical change in the capital
structure of the target. As a result of an LBO, ownership of the target will
be concentrated in the hands of the sponsoring LBO firm. In addition, LBO
firms generally require the target's postacquisition managers to purchase a
significant equity stake in the target. This ensures that the managers'
financial interests are aligned with those of the LBO firm while creating a
87. See Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate
Governance Through American Eyes, 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 203, 212.
88. For an overview of the structure of an LBO firm, see Jack Levin, Structuring
Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions ch. 10 (2006).
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powerful incentive for managers to increase the value of the target's
equity. 89 Together, these two features of target's capital structure help
alleviate the well-known agency problem created by the separation of
ownership and control in publicly traded companies. Although the
evidence is not entirely free from doubt, at least one important study of the
1980s takeover wave suggests that part of the acquisition premium offered
in LBOs of publicly traded targets stemmed from the elimination of these
agency problems. 90
Even more importantly, an LBO firm will fundamentally change a
target's capital structure by using a high degree of financial leverage in its
acquisition financing. For instance, in their study of 124 management
buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989, Steven Kaplan and Jeremy
Stein found an average debt-to-firm value ratio of almost 90% for
completed buyouts. 9 1 As Figure 8 shows, LBOs today continue to be
financed with significant amounts of debt, with LBOs completed in 2006
averaging a debt-to-firm value ratio of approximately 60%.92 The reasons
for this choice of financing are twofold. First, debt financing can
considerably enhance an LBO firm's return on investment. In particular, to
the extent an LBO firm can finance an acquisition with borrowed funds, any
appreciation in the value of the target that exceeds the fixed cost of
borrowing will accrue to the LBO firm and its investors. 93  Second,
acquiring the target with debt financing effectively recapitalizes the target's
business with debt, allowing the LBO firm to capture many of the benefits
of debt discussed previously. These include the enhanced incentive to
operate the target's business efficiently to meet scheduled interest payments
as well as the considerable financial benefits of the tax shield. In fact, the
tax benefits alone appear to have been a primary determinant of how great
89. See id. ch. 5 (discussing buyout structure).
90. See Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in
Going Private Transactions, 44 J. Fin. 771 (1989).
91. See Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C. Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and
Financial Structure in the 1980s, 108 Q. J. Econ. 313, 326 (1993).
92. See S&P Leveraged Commentary, supra note 76, at 1. As mentioned in supra note
85, however, the total amount of debt financing anticipated to be used by the target may be
more than this amount to the extent that an LBO firm conducts a postacquisition dividend
recap.
93. The power of leverage to enhance investment returns can be demonstrated using a
simple home purchase example. Assume a house is for sale for $150,000 and is expected to
have a resale value in one year's time of $180,000. Acquiring the home with $150,000 in
cash would therefore result in a return on investment of 20% (i.e., $30,000 profit/S150,000
investment). However, by using only $15,000 in cash (10%) and borrowing the rest of the
purchase price ($135,000) at 10% interest, the investment return would increase nearly
threefold. For an investment of $28,500 ($15,000 down payment + $13,500 interest for one
year), the purchaser would receive a net payout of $45,000 ($180,000 sales price - $135,000
loan balance), yielding a one-year return of 58%. It is the power of leverage to enhance
returns in this fashion that is a principle reason why LBO firms seek large amounts of debt
financing. Conversely, it is for the same reason that the LBO markets will virtually
evaporate when the debt markets contract. See Leslie Green, Platforms Play Solid, Add-Ons
Anticipated, Buyouts, Mar. 26, 2001, at 1, 1.
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an acquisition premium an LBO firm could afford to pay for many of the
buyouts effected during the 1980s.94 Consequently, whether to remain a
competitive bidder in an auction or to maximize its investment returns, an
LBO firm has a significant incentive to maximize the use of debt
financing. 95
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In contrast, strategic bidders have generally used far lower levels of debt
financing when making corporate acquisitions. Aloke Ghosh and Prem
Jain, for instance, analyzed the financial leverage changes associated with
239 mergers involving strategic bidders and targets occurring between 1978
and 1987.96 Ghosh and Jain hypothesized that publicly held bidders had
significant incentives to increase their leverage levels in connection with the
acquisition of a preexisting business. In particular, the combination of two
existing businesses whose earnings were not perfectly correlated with one
another should increase the debt capacity of the surviving firm.97 This
94. See, e.g., Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr., Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going
Private Transactions Revisited, 25 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 187, 187-88 (1998) (finding the
"size of the firm and its potential for tax reductions [from debt financing] to be significant
determinants of the premiums paid to take it private" in a sample of LBOs completed during
the 1980s); see also Kaplan, supra note 79, at 619 (finding in a sample of buyouts completed
in the 1980s that the median value of tax benefits from the value of anticipated interest
deductions from an LBO ranged from 129.7% of the premium paid to prebuyout
shareholders (assuming a tax rate of 46%) to 42.3% (assuming a tax rate of 15%)).
95. Not surprisingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that LBO firms will utilize as much
debt in an acquisition as the debt markets will provide, in effect letting lenders set a target's
leverage level. See David Snow, In Credit Crunch, Auctions Are Less Pleasant, Buyouts,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 1, 22-23.
96. See Aloke Ghosh & Prem C. Jain, Financial Leverage Changes Associated with
Corporate Mergers, 6 J. Corp. Fin. 377, 383 (2000).
97. See id. at 380. In effect, the earnings of one business might subsidize an earnings
shortfall in the other business during an adverse market cycle, thus reducing the surviving
firm's bankruptcy risk. The idea that an increase in debt capacity could result from a merger
of two firms and thus provide a motive for a merger was first proposed by Wilbur G.
Lewellen. See Wilbur G. Lewellen, A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate
Merger, 26 J. Fin. 349 (1971); see also R.C. Stapleton, Mergers, Debt Capacity, and the
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additional debt capacity, in turn, should allow the surviving firm to take on
additional debt, which would enhance firm value given the resulting tax
shields.98
In support of this hypothesis, Ghosh and Jain found that bidders and
targets increased their combined debt-to-firm value ratio from an average of
32.9% prior to each merger to 38.4% after it. 99 Yet even assuming this
increase in leverage was reflected in a bidder's original valuation of
target, 100 it represents less than half the average leverage ratio of LBOs
occurring during the same period and only slightly more than half the
average leverage ratio used in LBOs during 2006. Moreover, Ghosh and
Jain modeled each postacquisition firm's "optimal" debt capacity by
regressing financial leverage on a number of industry and firm variables
that ordinarily correlate with debt ratios. Based on these models, Ghosh
and Jain found that the merged firms had considerable unused debt capacity
in the five years following each transaction, indicating "that merged firms
could increase financial leverage even more if they wanted to."'' In short,
unlike LBO firms, strategic bidders do not appear inclined to use as much
debt as possible in financing an acquisition.
In light of the prior discussion about optimal capital structure, the
disparity between leverage levels of strategic bidders and LBO firms should
hardly be surprising. A bidder's acquisition of a company is but one type of
investment project 10 2 that will presumably conform to the bidder's general
financing and capital structure policies. The highly leveraged capital
structure of an LBO represents a leverage policy that is likely ill-suited for
most strategic bidders. This seems especially true for publicly traded
bidders who may have to balance the benefits of debt financing against
considerations about the effect of leverage on its core business, whether it
might impair earnings accretion following the acquisition, and the reaction
of analysts, customers, employees, and suppliers to a downgrade in the
bidder's credit rating. 10 3 Not surprisingly, several studies have confirmed
that a bidder's choice of payment method in an acquisition reflects the same
Valuation of Corporate Loans, in Mergers and Acquisitions (Michael Keenan & Lawrence J.
White eds., 1982) (discussing the possibility of creating value through mergers by making
debt safer).
98. See Ghosh & Jain, supra note 96, at 380.
99. See id. at 386-87.
100. This appears to be a reasonable assumption. Ghosh and Jain found that almost all of
the increase in financial leverage took place close to the completion date of the merger. See
id. at 387. Moreover, in a cross-sectional regression analysis, they found that market-
adjusted returns following the announcement of a merger were positively related to increases
in financial leverage following the merger, suggesting that the stock market incorporated the
future benefits of the anticipated tax shields when the merger was first announced. See id. at
395-99.
101. Id. at 389-90.
102. See Yakov Amihud, Baruch Lev & Nickolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Control and
the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 45 J. Fin. 603,
604 (1990).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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considerations that animate the debate over optimal capital structure.
Consistent with the trade-off theory, for instance, publicly traded bidders
with large growth opportunities are significantly more likely to use stock to
finance an acquisition than to use cash and debt. 10 4 Likewise, consistent
with the pecking order theory, publicly traded bidders have been found to
finance acquisitions with stock rather than cash where a bidder's stock
appears to be overvalued by the market. 10 5 And consistent with the agency
cost theory, publicly traded bidders subject to significant agency problems
appear to avoid financing an acquisition with debt to escape the disciplining
effect of leverage. 106
Moreover, strategic bidders may feel little need to tap into the implicit
subsidy of debt financing to bid successfully for a target. Where a bidder is
publicly traded, the ability to use its stock as acquisition currency may offer
some strategic advantages over cash to the target's managers and
shareholders. For instance, stock acquisitions can qualify for tax-free
reorganization treatment, allowing a target's shareholders to postpone
payment of taxes on the disposition of their target securities. A target's
managers who hold significant ownership stakes in the target may also
prefer to receive stock in exchange for their target securities as a way of
retaining influence in the combined firm. 10 7
Perhaps most importantly, a strategic bidder may not need to rely on the
tax shields created by debt financing to bid successfully for a target because
of the potential for realizing significant operating synergies in an
acquisition. Whereas LBO firms have traditionally valued a target based on
efficiency enhancements to a target's existing business and changes to the
target's capital structure,1 08 a strategic bidder is generally believed to make
104. See Kenneth J. Martin, The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions,
Investment Opportunities, and Management Ownership, 51 J. Fin. 1227 (1996). Martin
suggests that growth firms prefer stock as an acquisition currency for the same reason that
growth firms issue equity rather than debt when raising capital: "[T]he discretion associated
with equity financing is valuable for firms with good investment opportunities since it makes
it more likely that these firms can fully take advantage of their investment opportunities." Id.
at 1229.
105. See Nickolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment, and
Bidding Firms' Stock Returns, 42 J. Fin. 943, 961 (1987). Recall that a principal contention
of the pecking order theory is that managers time stock issuances to coincide with periods
when a company's stock is perceived as overvalued. See supra text accompanying notes 40-
44.
106. See Martin, supra note 104, at 1229 ("Firms with poor investment opportunities
issue debt if management is monitored by the capital providers to the firm and issue equity
otherwise."). The role of agency costs in the financing of acquisitions, however, is not
entirely clear in the financial literature. Notwithstanding Martin's conclusion that disloyal
managers prefer stock acquisitions, others have contended that a bidder's managers who
value control may prefer financing acquisitions with cash and debt. By using this form of
financing, managers can avoid the dilution that would occur to their voting control if they
issued new stock. For an empirical examination supporting this hypothesis, see Amihud et
al., supra note 102, at 607-15.
107. See Aloke Ghosh & William Ruland, Managerial Ownership, the Method of
Payment for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention, 53 J. Fin. 785, 786 (1998).
108. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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its valuations based on anticipated operating synergies of the surviving
firm. 10 9  These operating synergies can include any number of
improvements to the cash flows of the combined firms, such as elimination
of overlapping facilities, improved efficiency in production or
distribution, 10 greater realization of economies of scale,"' l increased
monopoly power, 112 and product diversification and utilization of excess
capacity."13  Empirical evidence on whether strategic bidders actually
realize these synergies is mixed, 114 but it seems clear that the expectation of
synergies plays a critical role in the valuation of a target by a strategic
bidder. Attempts to measure empirically the relationship between
anticipated operating synergies and acquisition premiums reveal a strong
relationship between the two. 115 And within the mergers and acquisitions
109. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597,
608 (1989) ("An important source of potential gain from takeovers is synergy between buyer
and seller that permits the merged company to be run more efficiently.... The hypothesis
that ... operating synergy is a major source of stock price gains from takeovers has wide
currency in the literature.").
110. See C. Edward Fee & Shawn Thomas, Sources of Gain in Horizontal Mergers:
Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms, 74 J. Fin. Econ. 423, 424 (2004).
111. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & Econ. 371, 381-82 (1980).
112. See B. Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J.
Fin. Econ. 241, 242 (1983).
113. See Ken C. Yook, Larger Return to Cash Acquisitions: Signaling Effect or Leverage
Effect?, 76 J. Bus. 477, 480 n.3 (2003). These benefits are, of course, in addition to any
enhanced cash flows a bidder might anticipate if the bidder believes the target is inefficiently
managed. See id.
114. See, e.g., Fee & Thomas, supra note I10, at 455-58 (finding evidence consistent
with improved productive efficiency and buying power as sources of gains for horizontal
mergers); Paul M. Healy et al., Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?, 31 J.
Fin. Econ. 135 (1992) (finding in a study of the fifty largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and
1984 that "[m]erged firms show significant improvement in asset productivity relative to
their industries, leading to higher operating cash flow returns"). But see Black, supra note
109, at 606 ("[E]xcept for horizontal mergers, where the case for operational synergy is
strongest, there is a substantial gap between the observed stock price gains and the proposed
sources for the gains."); Aloke Ghosh, Does Operating Performance Really Improve
Following Corporate Acquisitions?, 7 J. Corp. Fin. 151 (2001) (identifying methodological
shortcomings in prior studies of acquisitions finding operating improvements). For a survey
of the relevant literature examining this issue, see Robert F. Bruner, Does M&A Pay? A
Survey of Evidence for the Decision-Maker, 12 J. Applied Fin. 48 (2002).
115. See, e.g., Matthew T. Billett & Mike Ryngaert, Capital Structure, Asset Structure
and Equity Takeover Premiums in Cash Tender Offers, 3 J. Corp. Fin. 141, 162 (1997)
(finding that a target's abnormal equity returns were increasing in the target's liability-to-
equity ratio and decreasing with respect to the financial asset-to-equity ratio, which is
consistent with the idea that bidding firms pay a premium for control of target equity based
on how much they believe they can revalue its nonfinancial assets); Joel F. Houston et al.,
Where Do Merger Gains Come From? Bank Mergers from the Perspective of Insiders and
Outsiders, 60 J. Fin. Econ. 285, 305-13 (2001) (finding in a sample of bank mergers a
significant relationship between the present value of anticipated cost savings arising from a
merger and announcement day returns of both the bidder and the target).
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industry, the belief that strategic bidders can achieve substantial operating
synergies through acquisitions is nothing short of an article of faith. 116
For many years, the size of these anticipated operating synergies-
especially when combined with healthy equity markets-gave strategic
bidders a clear pricing advantage over LBO firms when bidding for targets.
As one lawyer specializing in LBO transactions summarized in 2006, "A
few years ago, in an auction situation, the seller's investment bank would
typically say, 'Here are the strategic buyers,' and almost as an afterthought,
'Here are the financial buyers-we'll never get the same price from
them."1 7 In Buyouts magazine (a leading trade publication within the LBO
industry), the historic pricing advantage of strategic bidders over LBO firms
was a constant source of analysis (and angst) from the founding of the
magazine in the early 1990s. The advantage of strategic bidders was
commonly discussed, and in 1995 the magazine commenced an annual poll
of industry participants to monitor the pricing "gap" between strategic and
financial buyers." 18
Without exception, the cause of the gap was attributed to the ability of
strategic bidders to realize potential operating synergies, combined with the
attractiveness of offering stock consideration in certain market conditions.
Writing in 1996, for instance, a general partner of a middle-market LBO
firm provided a typical assessment:
Strategic buyers tend to be more aggressive in bidding on acquisitions
that offer the potential for operating synergies with their own
business .... The rising stock market has [also] created a greater
disparity between valuation multiples of public versus private companies,
and as the disparity widens, strategic buyers have been willing to bid
more aggressively for acquisitions.... This trend works to enhance the
fundamental competitive advantages-the ability to generate operating
synergies-that strategic buyers already have over financial buyers. 119
Not surprisingly, LBO firms in many ways welcomed the end of the
1990s bull market as strategic bidders became considerably less active in
pursuing acquisitions. With a primary competitor sidelined, LBO firms
seized the opportunity to acquire targets that might otherwise have been out
of reach had better market conditions prevailed. As one general partner
116. See, e.g., Fee & Thomas, supra note 110, at 424 ("Managers of firms undertaking
horizontal mergers and acquisitions often cite improved productive efficiency as the primary
source of anticipated gains to mergers."); Yook, supra note 113, at 480 (commenting that
publicly traded "[b]idders almost always allege that the creation of an enhanced combined
effect is the driving motive for their acquisition attempts and that the acquisition creates
value for shareholders").
117. Kate O'Sullivan, Rising Stakes: How the Strength of Private Equity Is Changing
M&A for Corporate Buyers, CFO, July 2006, at 39, 39 (quoting John LeClaire, chairman of
the private equity practice at Goodwin Procter LLP).
118. See Jennifer Lea Reed, Purchase Multiples Press to Rarefied Heights, Buyouts, Feb.
20, 1995, at 1.
119. Ronald A. Kahn & Susan W. Wilson, Private Equity, a la Porter, Its Present and
Future, Buyouts, Jan. 29, 1996, at 16, 17.
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remarked in a 2003 interview with Buyouts, "In years gone by, if strategic
buyers were interested, a financial buyer couldn't win, but in this
environment there is a tremendous opportunity for the financial players to
pursue and capture high quality assets." 120 The article noted, however, that
with market conditions expected to improve in 2004, the conventional
wisdom was that strategic bidders would return to acquisitions, making it
once again difficult for LBO firms to compete in an auction environment. 121
Yet when strategic bidders did return to the acquisition market in 2004
and 2005, LBO firms found that the traditional pricing advantage of
strategic bidders had largely dissipated. On the contrary, as numerous
industry participants and journalists observed, the reverse held true: after
2004, "[s]trategic buyers [had] a hard time competing against private equity
firnS."
122
2. The Evolution of Leveraged Buyouts: Combining Operating
Synergies with Debt Financing
What explained the change in the competitive position of LBO firms?
As this section argues, much of the reason stems from LBO firms'
comparatively greater willingness to use debt financing in combination with
two important developments during the late 1990s: first, a dramatic
increase in the availability of credit for LBO firms owing to a radical
transformation in bank lending, and second, a more entrepreneurial
approach to LBOs that became typical for LBO firms. The result of these
120. Kenneth MacFadyen, LBO Floodgates Open in Third Quarter: Increased Stability
Fuels $21.45B Quarter, Buyouts, Oct. 6, 2003, at 1, 55 (quoting Jamie Singleton, vice
chairman of the Cypress Group).
121. See id. ("Private equity groups will find it increasingly difficult to compete. They've
largely had the field to themselves and the strategics are coming back into the picture .... It
will come down to how low [LBO firms] will be willing to lower their returns if they really
want to compete." (quoting Glenn Gurtcheff, director and cohead of U.S. Bancorp Piper
Jaffray's middle-market mergers and acquisitions group)).
122. Steve Rosenbush, Deals of the Year, in a Year of Deals, BusinessWeek, Dec. 19,
2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/dec2006/db20061218_740232.htm
(quoting Joe Ravitch, a senior media banker at Goldman Sachs); see also Five Questions
with... David Santoni Managing Director, Goldsmith Agio Helms, Buyouts, Jan. 23, 2006,
at 51, 51 (noting that strategic buyers "are aggressively pursuing selective acquisitions but
are oftentimes being outbid by financial buyers in competitive processes" (quoting David
Santoni)); Klee, supra note 12 ("'Gone are the days when the strategic always had an
advantage because of the synergies. It has shifted meaningfully so that we see private equity
all over our spaces all the time. And they're teaching the sellers to have expectations around
prices that have impacted and infected the entire seller's market."' (quoting Anne Madden at
Honeywell International, Inc.)); O'Sullivan, supra note 117, at 39 ("Strategic buyers ...
have plenty of cash themselves. But no longer can they expect financial buyers to shy away
from competing on price .... ); Squawk Box (CNBC television broadcast Oct. 11, 2006)
("We don't have any debt. And we are looking for acquisitions. It is a little frustrating in
my long experience now in this business, us strategic buyers used to be able to outbid
financial buyers because of our perceived ability to find synergies or economies in
companies that we acquired. Just now we are being outbid by financial buyers because we
just won't overpay." (quoting Frank Maclnnis, Chairman & CEO, EMCOR Group)).
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developments was that LBO firms could increasingly outbid strategic
bidders after 2004.
First, a "quiet revolution 123 in bank lending greatly increased the
availability of debt financing for LBOs during the 2004 to 2007 buyout
boom. In general, loans made to finance LBOs cannot qualify as
investment grade loans given the significant amount of debt LBOs
require, 124 and until the early 1980s, these "leveraged loans" were difficult
to obtain due to their enhanced credit risk. 125 The 1980s represented a
significant departure from this tradition as commercial banks increasingly
made secured term loans to fund leveraged acquisitions, providing
approximately 70% of all debt financing for the first wave of LBOs during
the early 1980s. 126 As is well known, the 1980s also witnessed the rise of a
public market for unsecured, high yield bonds from firms undergoing
LBOs, 127 and the ability of LBO firms to raise debt financing through
public offerings of "junk" bonds played a critical role in financing many of
the LBOs of the late 1980s. 128 Yet even after the rise of the junk bond
123. Glenn Yago & Donald McCarthy, Milken Inst., The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market:
A Primer, at i (2004).
124. In general, loans made by banks to corporate borrowers can be divided into two
classes: investment grade and leveraged loans. Investment grade loans are loans considered
to have a low rate of default risk as reflected in the ratings assigned to the loan by one of the
recognized debt ratings agencies. Loans rated Baa3/BBB- or higher reflect a judgment by
these agencies that the borrower has adequate payment capacity to honor the loans and the
loans are therefore considered "investment grade." See Damodaran, supra note 19, at 176.
The lower default risk associated with investment grade loans makes them easier to obtain
from lenders and at lower interest rates. In general, a leveraged loan is defined as any loan
that is not investment grade (i.e., any loan rated below Baa3/BBB-). For a discussion of the
manner in which ratings agencies rate loans, see id. at 177-79.
125. See Alison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary
Leveraged Loan Markets, in The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading 21, 23-24
(Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007).
126. See Kaplan & Stein, supra note 91, at 330; see also Taylor & Yang, supra note 125,
at 23-24.
127. The emergence of these "high yield" or "junk" bonds as a source of acquisition
financing was, of course, intimately tied with Michael Milken's ascent at the investment
bank Drexel Burnham Lambert. As summarized by Roberta Romano, "Milken reinvented
junk bonds as a financing mechanism for new ventures, and his support of a market for the
new issues that he placed, enabled small firms to acquire large ones previously considered
impervious to unsolicited bids, and changed the way business was conducted in the United
States." Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. Legal Educ. 342,
348 (2005).
128. Kaplan and Stein, for instance, found that public debt was hardly utilized in LBOs
that occurred prior to 1984 but increased greatly thereafter. In fact, much of the increase
occurred within a single year's time, with the percentage of LBOs utilizing public debt
increasing from 5.9% in 1984 to between 40% and 61.3% for the years 1985 through 1989.
See Kaplan & Stein, supra note 91, at 337. Moreover, they found that the ratio of bank debt
to total debt was 11.1% lower in buyouts using junk bonds. See id. at 338. These findings
led Kaplan and Stein to conclude that the utilization of public debt likely played a significant
role in the "overheating" of the buyout market towards the end of the 1980s. They observed,
"This pronounced crowding out of the bank debt by junk bonds is consistent with the notion
that overheated junk bond investors were willing to bid more aggressively for buyout loans
than were the relatively defensive bankers." See id.
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market, senior secured bank debt remained the core source of debt financing
throughout the 1980s. Even at the height of the 1980s buyout wave, high
yield, "junk" financing never exceeded 30% of the total amount of debt
financing of LBOs, while traditional bank debt never fell below 52%.129
Today, public, high yield debt financing represents only a sliver of the debt
financing used to fund LBOs while traditional "bank debt" continues to
dominate by a wide margin. 130
It is within this core segment of bank lending that a quiet revolution
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s that significantly benefited LBO firms
during the 2004 to 2007 buyout boom. The revolution started with the rise
of syndicated bank loans made to fund LBOs in the mid-1980s.
Traditionally, leveraged bank loans were negotiated as bilateral, individual
credit agreements between a bank and a lender in much the same way that
an individual might obtain a home mortgage. During the 1980s, however,
banks began to provide LBO loans by means of syndicating the loans
among a large group of banks (the syndicate) in which a single bank acted
as the primary arranger in negotiating, drafting, and closing the
transaction. 131 Each lender would then hold a proportionate interest in the
total loan (generally an amortizing term loan or revolving credit facility),
which would be held to maturity for the above-market yield.132
Significantly, the late 1990s witnessed a substantial decrease in the number
of banks willing to participate in leveraged loan syndications due in large
part to the promulgation of new banking regulations that limited the holding
of highly leveraged loans by banks.1 33 In addition, banks also began using
129. See id. at 331, 337.
130. According to Standard and Poor's data, public, high-yield bonds constituted only
3.42% of the average source of proceeds for LBOs completed in the fourth quarter of 2006
while bank debt represented 52.41%. See S&P Leveraged Commentary, supra note 76, at 1.
The total amount of debt financing for LBOs during this time was 67.3%, indicating that
public, high-yield bonds represented approximately 5% of the total debt financing used with
bank debt representing over 77%. See id. The role of high-yield bonds has in many ways
been taken by the use of "second-lien" loans. See, e.g., Christopher O'Leary, As Libor Keeps
Rising, Issuers Start Worrying: When Will Investors Lose Their Taste for Second-Lien
Loans?, Investment Dealers Digest, May 15, 2006, at 8, 8 ("'Second-lien issuance has taken
the place of high-yield bond issuance .... ' (quoting Amy Gibson, a vice president in the
high-yield group at 40/86 Advisors)); Robert Horton et al., Fitch Ratings, High Yield and
Leveraged Loan Market Review: Fourth Quarter and 2006, at 3 (2007) ("Much of the
second-lien issuance has directly replaced bonds."). Also known as junior secured or
tranche B loans, second-lien loans are bank loans secured by a lien on substantially all of the
borrower's assets, however, the security is subordinate to the claims of other first-lien loans.
Prior to 2003, second-lien loans were not commonly sold in the syndicated loan market, but
since then, second-lien loan use in syndicated loans has risen dramatically, representing 8%
of total institutional loan volume in 2006. See id. at 4. For an overview of second-lien loans,
see Marc Hanrahan & David Teh, Second Lien Loans, in The Handbook of Loan
Syndications and Trading, supra note 125, at 108.
131. See Taylor & Yang, supra note 125, at 23-24.
132. See id. at 24.
133. In 1989, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provided guidelines regarding highly leveraged
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portfolio management techniques and profitability models that biased banks
against holding leveraged loans. 134
In their stead, however, a new group of institutional investors emerged
who were drawn to leveraged loan syndications for both their high yield
and potential risk-adjusted returns. 135 As Figure 9 illustrates, the abrupt
transformation of the leveraged lending market from one in which
traditional, commercial banks were the primary lenders to one in which
these nonbank, institutional investors became the primary source of capital
was nothing short of extraordinary. 136 Comprised of high-yield mutual
funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and collatorized loan obligations
(CLOs), institutional investors radically redefined the leveraged-loan
market. In particular, the emergence of these investors facilitated the
development of the syndicated loan market into a mature asset class, which
greatly enhanced the attractiveness of syndicated loans as an investment
option. 137 A clear indicator of the manner in which the loan market
matured was the exponential growth of the secondary trading market in loan
interests. Whereas a total of $8 billion of syndicated loans traded in the
secondary market during 1991, the annual trading volume of these loans
increased to $238 billion by 2006.138 Significantly, the vast majority of
these trades-over 80% by value-involved leveraged loans. 139  As a
consequence, the leveraged loan market began to attract investors not only
because of the yields on the underlying loans, but also because of the
opportunity to capitalize on price movements and temporary market
inefficiencies. 140
transactions that resulted in limiting banks' holdings of leveraged loans. See Yago &
McCarthy, supra note 123, at 16.
134. See Steven Miller, New World Order, Deal, Sept. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.thedeal.com (paid subscription required).
135. See Taylor & Yang, supra note 125, at 24.
136. Figure 9 was derived from Scott Page & Payson Swaffield, An Introduction to the
Loan Asset Class, in The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading, supra note 125, at 3,
3. Today, nonbank, institutional investors acquire almost 80% of all leveraged loan
issuances. See S&P Leveraged Commentary, supra note 76, at 3. The growing importance
of institutional investors in the leveraged loan market is part of a broader twenty-year trend
in all areas of lending where intermediaries such as bank lenders are being displaced by the
ultimate source of funds, investors in the capital markets. In addition to leveraged loans, for
instance, this process of disintermediation has occurred in the market for home mortgages,
auto loans, and credit card receivables. For an overview of this process, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Structured Finance: A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization § 1:1 (3d
ed. 2002).
137. See generally Page & Swaffield, supra note 136, at 6-18; Yago & McCarthy, supra
note 123, at 26-38.
138. Reuters Loan Pricing Corp., U.S. Secondary Loan Market Volume,
http://www.loanpricing.com/analytics/pricingservice-volumel.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2008).
139. See Yago & McCarthy, supra note 123.
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The ultimate result of this transformation was a meteoric rise in the
demand for leveraged loans as institutional investors increasingly migrated
to the syndicated loan market. In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, U.S.
leveraged loan issuances set new records at $265 billion, $295 billion, and
$466 billion, respectively-over twice the amount of capital raised in U.S.
public equity markets during the corresponding years. 141 That the spike in
leveraged loans was driven by investor demand for them can be seen in the
rapid emergence of CLOs as the dominant institutional investor in the
market. 142 These special purpose investment funds are structured to invest
in a portfolio of syndicated loans, 143 and they experienced remarkable
growth following their debut in the early 1990s. The market value of
outstanding CLOs grew from less than $1 billion in 1994 to nearly $260
billion in 2004, while their share of the leveraged loan market increased
141. For data on syndicated loan issuances, see Steven C. Miller, Standard & Poor's, The
U.S. Leveraged Loan Market: Huge Deals, Few Bargains (2006),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1145997542521 .html
(reporting U.S. issuances for 2004 and 2005); Steven C. Miller, Standard & Poor's, Leveraged
Loans: Record-Setting Leveraged Loan Market Shows No Signs of Slowing (Yet) (2007),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1148406249020.
html (reporting U.S. issuances for 2006). For data on U.S. equity issuances, see Comm. on
Capital Mkts. Regulation, supra note 71, at 44.
142. See William May et al., Fitch Ratings, CLOs More Concentrated in Shareholder-
Friendly and Covenant Light Loans 1 (2006) ("One of the largest sources of increased
demand for leveraged loans-both on an absolute and relative basis-has been collateralized
loan obligations.").
143. A CLO uses the anticipated cash flows from its loan portfolio as the basis for issuing
its own bonds with varying degrees of creditworthiness. As a consequence, a CLO can
effectively turn a portfolio of noninvestment grade syndicated loans into a package of
investment grade bonds, noninvestment grade bonds, and equity securities that it can sell to
the public. For an overview of CLOs, see Bond Mkt. Ass'n, CDOs: A Primer, in The
Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading, supra note 125, at 709.
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from less than 5% to over 60% during the same time period. 144 Between
2003 and 2006, more than $200 billion of CLOs were issued, with $105
billion being issued in 2006 alone.' 45 Not surprisingly, by the end of 2006
industry commentators began describing the CLO market in terms
reminiscent of the dot-com frenzy in the late 1990s.146
For LBO firms, the heightened demand for leveraged loans created an
extremely favorable financing environment that helped fund significant
acquisition premiums. As shown in Figure 8 above, the growth in median
acquisition premiums for LBOs between 2002 and 2006 was accompanied
by a corresponding growth in the median amount of debt financing utilized.
As in the late 1980s, competition among lenders to secure loans resulted in
a greater willingness to finance buyouts at increasing leverage ratios 147 and
to ease credit standards and financing terms. 148 The ease of financing terms
144. See Barry Bobrow et al., An Introduction to the Primary Market, in The Handbook
of Loan Syndications and Trading, supra note 125, at 155, 165-66.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., David Henry, Danger-Explosive Loans, BusinessWeek, Oct. 23, 2006, at
89, 89 (quoting editor of Creditflux, an industry news service as stating, "Just about every
man and his dog is trying to do a CLO at the moment"); Judy McDermott, Healthy US CLO
Issuance Expected to Continue... For Now, LSTA Loan Market Chronicle, 2005, at 64, 64,
available at http://www.lsta.org/WorkArea/downloadasset.aspx?id=1570 ('"There's a crazy
amount of oversubscription [for new CLO issues].... Even with spreads where they are,
[CLOs] can still get done."' (quoting Fred Haddad, senior portfolio manager with GoldTree
Asset Management)).
147. See, e.g., Harold Blatt, The Forces Behind Today's Secured Borrowing Market,
Buyouts, June 6, 2005, at 40, 40 ("[T]here is significant increase in loan market liquidity and
aggressive competition from cash flow lenders that has forced asset-based lenders to take
more risk to win deals. As a result, debt to EBITDA multiples for leveraged buyouts
(LBOs), for example, have climbed to 5 x EBITDA in 2005. That compares to 3.7 x
EBITDA in 2001 .... ); George Ticknor & David Ruediger, Return of the Strategic Buyer:
A Seller's Perspective, Buyouts, Mar. 28, 2005, at 22, 22 ("Banks and finance companies are
eager to lend money at leverage multiples that are high by historic standards."). Much of the
competition among lenders appears to have stemmed from a "liquidity supply and demand
imbalance." Blatt, supra, at 40. As a marketing director for Bank of America noted in 2005,
"On the demand side, fewer companies are looking for external sources of financing since
they're generating more than enough cash from their operations." Id.; see also Randy Myers,
Money for Nothing: Bank Credit Is Easy, Maybe Too Easy. Don't Pass It Up, CFO, Apr.
2006, at 60, 62 ("'Everybody's looking for funded assets .... There is too much liquidity
chasing too few dollars .... When a [credit] facility does become available where it would
be drawn or utilized.., banks just fall all over themselves to get involved."' (quoting Joseph
Chinnici, managing director and head of debt-capital markets for KeyBanc Capital
Markets)).
148. In its 2006 underwriting survey, for instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency noted that "competitive pressures have led to a third consecutive year of eased
credit underwriting standards. Examiners report that national banks have eased underwriting
standards for both commercial and retail credit products." Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices 4 (2006), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/2006Underwriting/2006UnderwritingSurvey.pdf. Moreover, it
emphasized that competition for loans from nonbank investors "has influenced underwriting
terms for leveraged loans and pushed credit spreads lower." Id. Similar results were found
in the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
(SLOS). See Fed. Reserve Bd., The January 2007 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
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appears to have been especially important for LBO firms. Using loans that
had fewer restrictive covenants helped ensure that a target could retain
operational flexibility in the event of a business or economic downturn,
thereby lessening an important cost of debt financing. The combination of
easy bank financing and "covenant lite" credit agreements thus worked to
enhance the willingness of LBO firms to use debt financing as a means to
bid up purchase price multiples. Commenting on the heavily leveraged
buyout of Neiman Marcus, for instance, a partner at Warburg Pincus (one of
the LBO firms in the transaction) emphasized the importance of covenant
lite loans when pricing the transaction: "If the company hits a speed bump,
it gives it liquidity and a cushion . . . . This innovation was one factor
enabling us to pay a more aggressive price."'149
At the same time, competition among bidders created a strong incentive
to tap into this significant source of acquisition financing. As discussed
below, the takeover market from 2004 through early 2007 was
characterized by highly competitive auctions for targets which LBO firms
claimed led to significant pressure to increase purchase price multiples by
using more debt financing. In many cases, the investment bank managing a
target's auction would try to ensure this result by offering the same
aggressive debt financing package to all bidders in an auction (often
referred to as "staple financing"). 150 In November 2006, Hamilton James,
president of the Blackstone Group-one of the most active LBO firms-
noted that the pressure to remain a competitive bidder in these situations
often resulted in leverage ratios that made even the winning LBO firm
uncomfortable:
Maybe I'm excusing sponsors, but if a bank is selling a company, offering
a staple debt package of 7-1/2 times Ebitda, and you get a down cycle and
the company later defaults, is that failure the PE firm's fault? It didn't
define the level of debt in the deal-the bank did .... If you don't put
on Bank Lending Practices (2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/200701/default.htm (finding that
"[n]early all domestic banks and all U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks ...
indicated having eased their lending standards and terms in the January survey cit[ing] more-
aggressive [sic] competition from other banks or nonbank lenders as the most important
reason for having done so"). One of the most important manifestations of this trend was the
increase in "covenant lite" loans after 2004. Credit agreements ordinarily contain a number
of financial and nonfinancial covenants on the part of the borrower, which are designed to
help monitor borrower behavior and to align borrowers' actions with the interests of lenders
over the life of the loan. Starting around 2004, lenders significantly eased covenant
restrictions as lenders competed for loans. For instance, in a 2005 analysis of loan
covenants, Fitch Ratings found that for noninvestment grade loans the average number of
covenants incorporated into a typical noninvestment grade loan package in 2005 was six,
down from an average of eight for the period 2002 through 2004. See William May &
Mariarosa Verde, Fitch Ratings, Loan Volumes Surge, Covenants Shrink in 2005 (2005).
149. Henny Sender, Toggle Notes Are Buyout Fuel: Debt Structure Helps Default Rate
Stay Low, Driving Historic Boom, Wall St. J. (Europe), Feb. 22, 2007, at 19 (quoting
Kewsong Lee).
150. See Vyvyan Tenorio & David Carey, The Temptations of Private Equity, Deal, Nov.
17, 2006, available at http://www.thedeal.com (paid subscription required).
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that much leverage on, in theory, you can't get the same equity returns as
the [LBO firm] who's got a lower cost of capital with more debt. 15'
Within this aggressive debt financing environment, strategic bidders
stood at a distinct disadvantage in light of their historic reluctance to utilize
the same degree of debt financing as an LBO firm. Joe Ravitch, a senior
media banker at Goldman Sachs, attributed the reluctance to use debt
financing as a primary reason "[s]trategic buyers have a hard time
competing against private equity firms."' 152 According to Ravitch, "Private
equity funds have an advantage because they can take advantage of low-
cost leverage. Public corporations tend to use more expensive sources of
capital, such as their own stock, when making deals."'153 Not surprisingly,
financial and legal advisors began to urge strategic bidders to abandon their
traditional reluctance towards using debt financing to increase their
competitiveness with LBO firms. For instance, a 2007 article in Mergers
and Acquisitions Journal provided a number of suggestions for how
strategic bidders could enhance their competitiveness vis-d-vis LBO firms.
Topping the list was "Don't Fear Leverage."' 154 According to the article,
Strategic buyers generally shy away from taking on loads of leverage
because the management teams have to produce the cash flow to service
the debt. Nonetheless, says [Ravi Chanmugam, a partner in Accenture's
strategy/mergers and acquisitions group], "there has to be better use of
leverage by the strategics." One of the distinct competitive advantages of
PE firms is their ability to create deal structures with various
combinations of debt and equity. '
5 5
Yet the article noted that the advice may not be practical for many
strategic bidders given its conflict with the capital structure policies used by
most publicly traded firms. It therefore cautioned, "while highly leveraged
and richly priced transactions may produce greater returns, they often can
produce greater volatility and less earnings predictability, which is not the
risk/reward profile that's desired by many public-company
shareholders."] 56
Equally important in explaining the narrowing of the pricing gap between
strategic and LBO bidders was the evolution of the LBO industry during the
late 1990s and early 2000s. By 2000, the LBO market was considerably
different from that of the 1980s, both in terms of its size and the degree of
competitiveness among LBO firms. Whereas an estimated 113 LBO firms
managed approximately $4.5 billion in capital in 1980, an estimated 2700
LBO firms managed over $500 billion at the end of 2006.157
151. Id.
152. Rosenbush, supra note 122.
153. Id.
154. Joan Harrison, Holding Back in the M&A Race? Strategic Buyers Rack Up the
Deals but Do Nothing to Push the M&A Envelope, Mergers & Acquisitions, Jan. 2007, at 1.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id.
157. The Uneasy Crown, Economist, Feb. 10, 2007, at 74, 75.
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Simultaneously, the creative financial engineering strategies that fueled the
1980s buyout boom had become standard practice for every LBO firm and
even for many prospective targets. 158 As Bengt Holmstrom and Steven
Kaplan have argued, U.S. companies in the 1990s routinely began to follow
many of the principles pioneered by LBO firms in the 1980s, such as a
focus on enhancing shareholder value and the use of incentive-based
compensation. 159 As a consequence, the ability to add significant value by
simply using traditional LBO strategies became considerably less likely
than in the 1980s. Adding to this challenge was the rise of the competitive
auction. Beginning in the 1980s, sellers of firms increasingly used
investment banks to conduct auctions among LBO firms and strategic
bidders as a means to secure greater acquisition premiums. 160 For LBO
firms, these developments heightened the need to find a competitive
advantage in an increasingly crowded marketplace. 161
Motivated by these competitive pressures, LBO firms began in the 1990s
to focus on operational efficiencies as a potential source of value creation in
leveraged acquisitions. As one industry observer summarized,
In the mid- 1 990s, a new investment model emerged with an added slant:
operational value building. This called for more CEO-style thinking, with
a focus on top-line growth and boosting profitability in ways that nurture,
rather than gut, businesses. Soon, "value creation" became an LBO
industry mantra. (Not coincidentally, it was about this time that LBO
specialists started calling what they do "private equity.") 162
By 2000, the transition to this new model appeared to have been largely
complete. According to one industry survey conducted in 2000, general
partners of LBO firms indicated that from 1986 to 1990, financial leverage
contributed 41% to average LBO returns while operating improvement
accounted for 34%; by contrast, from 1996 to 2000 operating improvement
contributed 43% to average LBO returns, while financial leverage had
fallen to 24%.163 Indeed, during 2006 and 2007, this enhanced focus on
158. See Neil Harper & Antoon Schneider, Private Equity's New Challenge: A Changed
Competitive Landscape Calls for a Different Business Model, McKinsey Q., Summer 2004.
159. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. Econ.
Persp. 121 (2001).
160. See supra note 83; see also Harper & Schneider, supra note 158, at 2 ("Almost all
significant deals today are subject to a visible and public auction process as sellers seek the
maximum price. In many large deals, the number of bidders, both alone and in consortia,
can reach double digits.").
161. See Mike Wright et al., Firm Rebirth: Buyouts as Facilitators of Strategic Growth
and Entrepreneurship, 15 Acad. of Mgmt. Executive 111,122 (2001).
162. David Carey, Not Your Father's LBO, Deal, Sept. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.thedeal.com (paid subscription required).
163. See Janet Whitman, Something Ventured: LBO Firms Seek Hands-On Expertise,
Dow Jones News Serv., Apr. 2, 2003 (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see also
Harper & Schneider, supra note 158, at 4 ("Several buyout firms now recognize that they
can create value (in conjunction with management teams) by participating more in managing
the companies in their investment portfolio and by developing cross-industry functional
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value creation-along with the resulting jobs it creates-became a critical
part of a large-scale marketing campaign by LBO firms to enhance the
international image of private equity.164
This new LBO model also appeared in a number of industry trends that
occurred after 2000. For instance, because these "entrepreneurial" buyouts
demand significant operational skills, a noticeable change occurred in the
composition of general partners at many LBO firms. Whereas general
partners in the 1980s had their roots in the corporate finance divisions of
investment banks, LBO firms in the 1990s began recruiting prominent
executives from Fortune 500 companies as partners or advisers and
assembling panels of executives with expertise in particular industries. 165
Likewise, this entrepreneurial philosophy appeared in the rise of a variation
of the leveraged buyout-the leveraged buildup. In a leveraged buildup, an
LBO firm pursues a "buy and build" strategy in which it uses an existing
portfolio company to pursue multiple strategic acquisitions. 66  By
skills-including marketing, pricing, lean manufacturing, and procurement and supply chain
management."). At about this time, finance scholars also began to question whether the
traditional agency cost view of LBOs was appropriate and to examine whether some LBOs
might be motivated by a growth-oriented perspective. See Mike Wright et al.,
Entrepreneurial Growth Through Privatization: The Upside of Management Buyouts, 25
Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 591 (2000). For a survey of this literature, see Hans Bruining & Ernst
Verwaal, Erasmus Research Inst. of Mgmt., Successful Management Buyouts: Are They
Really More Entrepreneurial? (2005), available at
https://dspace.ubib.eur.nl/bitstream/1765/7130/1/ERS+2005+076+STR.pdf.
164. Much of this campaign was directed at Europe where LBOs have traditionally been
associated with significant layoffs. Anxiety over the growth of LBOs in Germany, for
instance, appeared in Germany's 2005 general election campaign when Franz Miintefering,
then-chairman of Germany's Social Democrat Party, famously criticized private equity firms
as "a swarm of locust[s]." Peter Smith, 'Locusts' Swarm to Germany in Effort to Improve
Image, FT.com, Feb. 19, 2006,
http://search.ft.com/fiArticle?queryText-locusts+swarm+to+germany&y=0&ajee=true&x=0
&id=060219003853&ct-0. In response, some of the largest LBO firms commenced a tour
of Europe, emphasizing their focus on value creation and the jobs they create. See, e.g.,
Hamilton E. James, President, Blackstone Group, Growing the Italian Economy: The Case
for Private Equity Investment, Address at the Hotel Parco dei Principi, Rome (Nov. 27,
2006), available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/events/2006/PrivateEquity/JamesSpeech.pdf;
see also The Uneasy Crown, supra note 157 ("[S]ince the mid-1990s private-equity firms
have taken every opportunity to stress that they do not depend on financial engineering....
Instead, they prefer to draw attention to other ways in which they improve the firms they
own.").
165. See Carey, supra note 162; see also Harper & Schneider, supra note 158, at 4
("Several firms have begun to build groups of strategists, former operating executives, and
turnaround specialists, while others have entered into alliances with third parties to provide
such services."). Some notable former chief executive officers who were recruited by LBO
firms include General Electric's Jack Welch, hired by Clayton Dubilier & Rice, Ford's
Jacques Nasser, hired by One Equity Partners, and IBM's Lou Gerstner, hired by the Carlyle
Group. By 2006, even Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR)--the buyout firm that
originated the cost-cutting LBO of the 1980s-claimed twenty-nine partners and managing
directors that had come from operating backgrounds. See Carey, supra note 162. KKR also
reestablished an in-house consulting operation, Capstone, which is dedicated to
brainstorming ways to foster growth among KKR's portfolio of operating companies. See id.
166. See Wright et al., supra note 161, at 116-17; see also Kahn & Wilson, supra note
119, at 17 ("In order to... compete more effectively against strategic buyers, many private
2008] 2019
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
combining multiple businesses within a single company, an LBO firm can
then realize operating synergies in much the same way that a traditional
strategic bidder might. Perhaps most significantly, LBO firms
demonstrated a marked tendency to specialize within particular industries as
a way of gaining operational expertise that they could leverage into
potential operating synergies. 167 Increasingly, LBO firms collaborated with
other LBO firms (and even strategic bidders) with complementary skill sets
to form bidding consortia that might offer significant growth strategies in
their bids. 16 8 In short, LBO firms---either singly or through collaborative
bidding-began acting like strategic bidders in their attempt to pursue
potential operating synergies.
Significantly, by behaving like quasi-strategic buyers, LBO firms could
also begin modeling their anticipated operating synergies into their takeover
bids. The result was the gradual erosion of the historic pricing gap between
LBO firms and strategic bidders during the late 1990s'69-a gap that
appears to have been filled by aggressive debt financing following the
meteoric rise in the demand for leveraged loans in 2004. Unwilling or
unable to tap into this valuable source of debt financing, strategic bidders
thus lost their traditional pricing advantage in competitive bidding contests.
3. Efficient or Inefficient Takeover? The Case of Equity Office Properties
Thus, the story of the recent buyout boom is highly suggestive that LBO
firms' more aggressive use of debt financing may have frequently played a
deciding factor in their ability to outbid strategic bidders. Consequently, to
the extent strategic bidders generally produce greater operating efficiencies
equity funds today are focusing on buy-and-build strategies and positioning themselves as
financial/strategic buyers.").
167. See Harper & Schneider, supra note 158; see also Five Questions with... Justin
Abelow Director, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Buyouts, Oct. 31, 2005, at 50, 50
(noting that LBO firms "are ... increasingly organized internally into industry silos.... so
even in the absence of [platform] portfolio companies they are bringing to bear highly-
refined industry expertise.").
168. See Harper & Schneider, supra note 158.
169. See David Snow, Multiples Show Who's Hot, Who's Not, Buyouts, Feb. 21, 2000, at
1, 23 (noting that "financial buyers lately have been even more aggressive than strategic
buyers in their bids, particularly when acquiring add-ons" because "[w]hen making an
acquisition through a platform company, financial buyers can afford to make the same bids
as traditional strategic buyers"); see also Five Questions with . . . Justin Abelow Director,
Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, supra note 167, at 50 ("[N]ow we are really seeing
financials acting more like strategics, in a whole variety of ways. First, of course, they are
acting increasingly through portfolio companies, effectively mimicking strategic synergies
and therefore pricing behaviors."); Jennifer Strauss, Amidst Turmoil, Multiples Stay Steady,
Buyouts, Feb. 19, 2001, at 1, 1 (noting that the "line between financial buyers and strategic
buyers started to blur last year as both groups paid similar prices for similar companies,
which sources attributed to a higher degree of specialization with private equity portfolios.");
Kopin Tan, Multiples Jump, Yet Again, as LBO Firms Close Gap, Buyouts, Feb. 23, 1998, at
1, 46 ("Sources came up with a variety of reasons explaining the closing of the pricing gap.
For a start, with more buyout firms pursuing buy-build strategies, G.P.s increasingly are
chasing synergies and behaving like quasi-strategic buyers.").
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and merger synergies than LBO firms, this uneven use of debt financing
may have led to any number of suboptimal takeovers. Yet it is also
imperative to emphasize the difficulty of determining this for certain,
particularly in light of LBO firms' increasingly entrepreneurial approach to
buyouts. In this regard, the story of the recent buyout boom is as much
about the need to be cautious in using the allocational efficiency normative
paradigm as it is about showing how debt financing can lead to suboptimal
takeovers.
To see why, consider the difficulty of using the allocational efficiency
normative paradigm to analyze the 2007 record-setting LBO of Equity
Office Properties (Equity Office) by the Blackstone Group (Blackstone). In
February 2007, Blackstone acquired Equity Office, a publicly traded real
estate investment trust, for $39 billion, displacing HCA as the largest LBO
in history. The final purchase price represented a significant increase from
Blackstone's original offer of $36 billion, which it had negotiated with
Equity Office in the fall of 2006.170 The reason for the increase was the
emergence of Vornado Realty Trust (Vornado) as a competing bidder in
January 2007.
As a publicly traded real estate investment trust (REIT), Vornado was
attracted to Equity Office due to its significant office holdings in a number
of coastal cities. Although Vornado planned on selling approximately $20
billion of Equity Office's properties after the transaction, its primary
motives for its bid were synergistic in nature: to "combine [Equity
Office's] best assets in key coastal markets with Vornado's existing office
platform in New York and Washington DC," to "[i]ntegrate the two
portfolios to create a series of powerful operating platforms in high growth,
high barrier-to-entry markets on each coast," and to "[e]mploy Vornado's
operating disciplines of leasing and expense control to enhance each asset's
profitability."' 171
Yet Blackstone, one of the largest LBO firms in the country, appears to
have anticipated some operating synergies of its own. Of the $67 billion
Blackstone had raised for LBOs, almost 20% had been devoted to real
estate transactions. 172 Formed in 1992, Blackstone's real estate group had
considerable experience in real estate investing and property management.
By the spring of 2007, it had invested in 214 separate real estate
transactions with a total enterprise value of over $102 billion. 173 Many of
these transactions were conducted in partnership with major real estate
operating companies such as Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., Host Marriott,
170. See Equity Office Agrees to Be Acquired by the Blackstone Group, Bus. Wire, Nov.
20, 2006.
171. Vomado Realty Trust, Discussion of Offer to Acquire Equity Office Properties (Feb.
1, 2007), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl 1MXs.u73h.htm.
172. Equity Office Agrees to Be Acquired by the Blackstone Group, supra note 170.
173. Blackstone Group, L.P., Pre-effective Amendment to Registration Statement
(Amendment No. 9 to Form S-i) 165 (June 21, 2007), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.u4V3.htm.
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Accor, and Berkshire Realty Company. 174 In addition, at the time of the
acquisition, the group had approximately forty real estate investment
professionals on staff.175  Not surprisingly, in announcing its original
agreement with Equity Office, Blackstone's remarks were decidedly
synergistic as well: "We believe that the skills and strengths of Equity
Office will greatly enhance our existing office platform, which has been
expanded through our recent acquisitions of CarrAmerica and Trizec."1 76
In the end, Blackstone's anticipated synergies may have been just enough
to allow it to use aggressive debt financing to win the contest. At $41
billion, Vornado's offer clearly exceeded even Blackstone's final offer, but
its offer to the Equity Office stockholders consisted of a combination of
45% stock and 55% cash. 177 In its shareholder proxy statement, Equity
Office explained that this combination of consideration reduced the value of
Vornado's offer as compared to Blackstone's all-cash offer for two reasons.
First, Vornado would be required to obtain its own stockholders' consent
before it could issue stock in the transaction, adding uncertainty to the
offer.178 Second, the solicitation of Vornado's stockholders would result in
a significant delay in closing of up to four to six months. 179
Vornado, of course, was well aware of these concerns based on Equity
Office's initial response to its offer and could have avoided them altogether
by making an all-cash bid. Doing so, however, would have required
Vornado to increase its level of debt financing, an option that would have
likely conflicted with what it believed to be a satisfactory financing policy
for a publicly traded REIT. In many ways, its original offer was already
pushing this policy to the limit given that Vornado intended to fund the cash
portion of its offer with debt financing amounting to 75% of the transaction
value. 180 However it was careful to emphasize to analysts and stockholders
that it planned to reduce this debt burden to 40% of Vornado's total
capitalization within one year of the transaction by selling off $10 billion of
Equity Office assets. The sales, Vornado assured analysts, "will allow us to
bring leverage down and retain our balance sheet flexibility."' 8 1 Moreover,
in addressing the question, "Why are you using 45% stock?" in its
discussion of the offer with analysts, Vornado further emphasized its desire
for financial flexibility:
We have always maintained a disciplined approach to our balance sheet
and want to appropriately capitalize this portfolio. The amount of stock
174. Real Estate Group, Blackstone Group, Blackstone Advantages,
http://www.blackstone.com/realestate/advantages.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
175. Equity Office Agrees to Be Acquired by the Blackstone Group, supra note 170.
176. Id.
177. Vornado Realty Trust, supra note 171.
178. Equity Office Properties Trust, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Feb. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvRm.u1Ce.htm.
179. See id.




being issued is based on the amount of equity we believe will maintain
our balance sheet flexibility over the long-term. 182
Free from these concerns and comfortable with a highly leveraged capital
structure, Blackstone could utilize a greater degree of debt financing to
submit its faster, more certain offer-its final, all-cash offer was funded
with debt financing amounting to 83% of its total bid.18 3
So who was the optimal bidder from the perspective of allocational
efficiency? Certainly, one could argue that the story of Equity Office is
simply a story about how Blackstone used aggressive debt financing to
impede a socially optimal bidder from acquiring target. As this Article has
demonstrated, the implicit subsidy of debt financing is real, and
Blackstone's financing structure would appear to be tapping into this
subsidy to compete with Vornado in much the same way that
ManagementCo used debt financing to compete with StrategyCo in Part
II.A. Yet this conclusion is made difficult by the fact that, as a REIT,
Equity Office effectively paid no corporate income tax,184 and Blackstone's
bid was structured to ensure that the surviving business would also be
treated as a flow-through entity for federal income tax purposes. As such,
the normal tax shields that arise from debt financing were actually not
available for the surviving firm and, consequently, could not be used by
Blackstone in valuing Equity Office.185 Accordingly, while this Article has
sought to emphasize how the implicit subsidy of debt can often affect
bidding outcomes, the Equity Office transaction must ultimately serve as a
telling reminder that an LBO firm acting as a quasi-strategic bidder does
not necessarily need the implicit subsidy of debt finance to outbid a
strategic bidder.
In the end, then, this more granular analysis of the general trend of LBO
firms to compete successfully with strategic bidders makes it less than clear
whether any particular buyout represents an inefficient takeover. But what
remains clear is that unless we take financing seriously, takeover
scholarship will continue to conclude wrongly that the highest priced offer
is necessarily the optimal offer and, in the process, will continue to risk
advocating legal rules that promote inefficient takeovers.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to introduce into legal scholarship a fact well
known among financial economists, investment bankers, and company
182. Id.
183. Equity Office Properties Trust, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Jan. 29, 2007),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvRm.ul lz.htm.
184. In a REIT, 95% of the net income is passed through to the stockholders and not
taxed at the corporate level. I.R.C. §§ 856-859 (2000).
185. Cf Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Taxes and the Capital Structure of Partnerships, REITs, and
Related Entities, 46 J. Fin. 401 (1991) (providing proof that the value of a REIT is invariant
to leverage decisions due to the absence of corporate taxes).
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managers: it matters how a bidder finances an acquisition offer. In every
acquisition, a bidder has the option of using debt financing, and when it
does, an implicit government subsidy will ordinarily appear in its ultimate
valuation of a target. Moreover, because financing policy is endogenous to
a firm, bidders will differ in their use of debt financing, thereby allowing
this subsidy to affect bidding contests particularly during periods of robust
credit markets, such as the market that existed during 2004 to 2007.
As this Article has shown, appreciating the influence of bidders'
divergent financing decisions on bidding outcomes has considerable
implications for analyzing real world takeovers. For takeover scholars,
bidders' divergent use of debt financing poses a fundamental challenge to
the standard efficiency framework traditionally used to analyze corporate
acquisitions. In particular, the ability of bidders' financing decisions to
affect bidder valuations reveals the inherent difficulty of using a bidder's
offer price as a proxy for its ability to put a target's assets to productive use.
Given the implicit subsidy of debt financing, the highest bidder in a
takeover contest may simply be the bidder that is most willing to tap into
this subsidy rather than the bidder that will optimize a target's business. As
a result, accurate analysis of allocational efficiency in real world takeovers
requires careful attention to how bidders form their valuations.
Likewise, for corporate directors considering a takeover bid, this Article
emphasizes the need to study closely the relationship between a bidder's
financing decision and its valuation of the target company. In light of this
relationship, a target's board can gain considerable insight into the value
proposition of a proposed takeover bid by explicitly examining a bidder's
anticipated financing structure. 186 Equally important, the analysis presented
here should encourage directors to understand how particular financing
decisions-and therefore particular sources of acquisition premiums-are
often tied to particular types of bidders. As this Article has demonstrated,
the highly leveraged capital structure of an LBO is likely ill-suited for most
publicly traded bidders. Understanding this feature of corporate finance
might be critical for a board seeking to discharge its fiduciary obligation of
care when assessing an acquisition offer from an LBO firm. 187
186. Not surprisingly, a discussion of a bidder's anticipated acquisition financing is a
standard part of most presentations made by a target's financial advisors to a target's board
of directors. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC & Morgan Stanley & Co., Project
Hero, Presentation to the Board of Directors of HCA Inc. (July 23, 2006), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dsVsf.v7Fu.b.htm.
187. The significance of this point was vividly illustrated during late 2006 as the recent
buyout wave reached its crest. Faced with the choice of approving or rejecting a buyout
offer from an LBO firm, target shareholders began to vote down proposals with increasing
frequency. In some cases, target shareholders explained their "no" votes on the basis that the
target's own management should be able to effect the changes proposed by the LBO firms
through a leveraged recapitalization, thereby allowing the target's existing stockholders to
realize the considerable returns expected by the LBO bidders. Following the announcement
of a proposed LBO of Clear Channel Communications, for instance, one prominent
shareholder objected to the proposal on the grounds that the company's managers should
engage in a "do-it-yourself leveraged buyout." Dennis K. Berman & Sarah McBride, Clear
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Lastly, for Congress, too, this Article has important implications. Indeed,
the fact that debt financing can impair allocational efficiency in the
takeover market is fundamentally a challenge for tax policy. While it is
beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the wisdom of the corporate
level tax that gives rise to this challenge, it is important to address in
closing at least one question implicit in this Article's thesis: should
Congress be concerned if existing tax law impairs allocational efficiency?
To be sure, the goal of promoting an allocationally efficient takeover
market is not one that has traditionally motivated tax policy. But one need
only consider the consequences of a takeover wave dominated by highly
leveraged bids to see why Congress might be concerned with the implicit
subsidy of debt financing. Indeed, given the credit crisis that has followed
the buyout wave of 2004 to 2007, Congress would seem to have a very real
interest in any tax rule that encourages bidders to use ever-greater amounts
of debt financing to remain competitive in an auction setting. To the extent
bidders miscalculate the financial distress costs of leverage, such a takeover
wave may significantly enhance the overall level of systematic risk in the
economy. These concerns are only accentuated by considering the more
prosaic effect of such a takeover wave on tax revenue: as target firms enjoy
the benefits of larger tax shields, an important source of tax revenue could
quickly diminish.188
In short, Congress, boards of directors, and legal academics must all take
seriously the power of debt financing to affect bidding outcomes.
Admittedly, such an endeavor will make more complicated and nuanced the
Channel Showdown Signals Investor Wariness of Private Buyouts, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 2007,
at Al. As the shareholder explained, "All the analyst reports say that private equity will be
making 23% [annual returns] on their investment. I find 23% a rather attractive proposition,
and I want it." Id. (quoting Jeremy Hosking). One must, of course, take seriously the
contention that a target's managers have indeed failed to optimize the target's business. Yet
when it comes to mimicking an LBO firm's proposed capital structure, a target's
shareholders and directors would be well advised to take seriously the central point of Part I:
the ability to utilize aggressive amounts of debt financing varies among companies for
reasons that may have nothing to do with agency problems. Failing to consider the very real
limitations even loyal managers face in determining a firm's optimal capital structure risks
overlooking-and perhaps even rejecting-the unique value offered by an LBO.
188. An examination of the relationship between the most recent LBO wave and tax
revenue is very much in order. The primary academic study of the extent to which LBOs
result in a reduction in the corporate tax base was last conducted in 1989 following the 1980s
buyout wave. See Michael Jensen et al., Effects of LBOs on Tax Revenues of the U.S.
Treasury, 42 Tax Notes 727 (1989). The authors estimated that, notwithstanding the
reduction in corporate tax receipts due to the heavy use of leverage, the U.S. Treasury likely
had a net gain in tax revenue from the buyout wave owing to an increase in capital gains
taxes assessed on target shareholders, an increase in taxable interest payments paid to
corporate debt holders, and an increase in corporate taxes as targets realized greater
operating efficiencies. Given the considerable changes to the buyout market identified in
this Article, it is unclear whether these conclusions would continue to hold today. In
particular, many of the holders of leveraged loans are no longer banks, but institutional
investors such as CLOs who may often be either tax exempt or non-U.S. taxpayers that pay
no tax on portfolio interest. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40. 1 am grateful to Vic
Fleischer for this insight.
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standard efficiency paradigm that has traditionally guided takeover analysis.
But to continue to ignore the systematic importance of finance in the name
of analytical simplicity is to reify a model of takeovers that is not only
inconsistent with the realities of everyday life but likely to confuse efficient
with inefficient takeovers.
